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This thesis is a document analysis of Israel’s actions in the international society of states, as 
restrained and enabled by the common values, norms and practices, in the timeframe of 1955 
to 1974. The analysis was conducted using the theoretical framework of Hedley Bull and his 
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Israel was established in the former Ottoman Empire districts of Damascus and Beirut in 
1948, as Britain withdrew from its Palestinian mandate. It was attacked the day after it 
declared itself independent and has since then been the arena of several wars, and much 
dispute. In spite of Israel’s dramatic history and its involvement in much international 
controversy, I was during my studies at Western Cape University in South Africa, astonished 
to learn about the military and political collaboration that existed throughout the 70’s and 80’s 
between the apartheid state of South Africa and the state of Israel. Having read ―The 
Unspoken Alliance‖ by Sasha Polakow-Suransky (2010), it made me wonder what brought 
about this unlikely collaboration of the Jewish state and the once Nazi-friendly and racist 
regime. The book also explained Israel’s strong efforts to build friendships towards post-
colonial African states and nations in the 50’s and 60’s.
1
 This paradox made me want to take 
a closer look at Israel and its international conduct. What would bring Israel to the drastic step 
of cooperating with the apartheid state? Was it the actions of an internal policy, the result of 
some external pressure or both? This initial curiosity made me question why Israel has acted 
as it has done, not just in relation to Africa, but in general. To anyone studying political 
science, or who is remotely interested in international affairs, it is obvious that Israel is often 
in conflict with its neighboring states and it is often the recipient of much international 
criticism.  
I wanted to investigate Israel’s actions not just as the outcome of its internal policy but as 
developed through its interaction with the international environment. In spite of Israel’s short 
history, there is a lot of material available on Israel’s history and its development. I tried to 
limit the research to a timeframe that I hoped would provide the most amounts of relevant 
data. I choose the period of 1955 to 1974, in which Israel was involved in much conflict, but 
also many other interesting events that shed light on both Israel’s actions and its relationship 
towards the international realm.  
 
After assessing competing theories of international relations and foreign policy I chose 
Hedley Bull theoretical concept of the ―International Society‖ as a framework for the thesis. 
Bull’s International Society was built on the concept of a society of sovereign states 
recognizing the mutual beneficial gains of cooperating to maintain a framework of values, 
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rules, norms and practices. The states provide this framework decentralized by giving their 
consent to it, mobilizing to enforce it or to change it. Together the states secure the elemental 
values of all social life; ―life, truth and property‖, through five institutions providing 
international order. A precondition for the international society is a functioning balance of 
power maintained by a great power management. ―Balance of Power‖ and ―Great Powers‖ are 
two Bull’s institutions. They enable the other three of Bull’s institutions; ―International Law‖, 
―War‖ and ―Diplomacy‖. 
 
This provides the theoretical backdrop of the international realm as a society where states are 
the primary actors collaborating and interacting with one another, which is necessary when 
looking at how Israel can have been influenced by its surroundings, not just vice versa. I will 
explain Bull’s institutions and how they provide order, in greater detail in the theory chapter.
2
 
The choice of theory and the limitation of the timeframe shaped the following research 
questions. 
 
1.2 Research questions: 
 
1. What do the actions of Israel in the international society of states from 1955 to 1974 
reveal about Israel’s relation to the framework of norms, rules and practices of the 
international society of states?  
2. How can Israel’s relationship towards the international rules, norms and practiced 
be said to influence its relationship towards Africa in the timeframe? 
 
1.3 Research purpose 
There are several reasons to conduct this research project. The case in itself can provide 
increased understanding of Israel`s choices and development seen in the international social 
setting of states of the timeframe. Israel was established under extraordinary circumstances in 
a period of colonial collapse and a great power shift following World War II. As the 
international realm was normalizing after the war, Israel maneuvered through several 
dramatic events while relating to the norms and practices of the state society of the time. The 
Middle East was an arena of much conflict and great power contest. For that reason Israel 
may represent a special case. As a geologist takes core samples by drilling to understand the 
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composition of the rock, he can get a clearer picture of the geological developments of that 
particular area. If the core samples revealed that area to once have been the impact zone of a 
massive meteorite, the geologist may have obtained data that offers explanations locally as 
well as of geological findings on a global scale. In this thesis our core sample spans from 
1955 to 1974. It can reveal what happened locally by reflecting Israel’s way of relating to 
social rules, norms and practices at the time, but can also have explanatory effects beyond 
Israel’s situation. It might shed light on similar events in other areas or even globally as the 
vast majority of states relate to common rules, norms and practices. It may also speak to our 
current situation in the international society of states. We are able to observe that material war 
and even armed interventions violating sovereignty is still conducted, despite lacking the 
necessary approval from the UN Security Council. I hope that Israel’s actions in this period of 
1955 to 1974 can shed some understanding on current developments.  
 
1.4 Research design 
This thesis will as explained deal with Israel’s interaction with the international realm from 
1955 to 1974. 1955 catches the events leading up to the Suez war of 1956 and 1974 includes 
the developments following the Yom Kippur War of 1973.To ensure an evenly distributed 
balance of data throughout I separate the timeframe into two ten year periods, 1955-1964 and 
1965 to 1974. Each period will be analyzed in light of the theoretical indicators based on 
Bull’s five institutions Balance of Power, International Law, War, Diplomacy and the Great 
Powers. This enables a clear understanding of how Israel interacted with the rules, norms and 
practices that these institutions enveloped. This period is quite extensive in order provide a 
coherent development in order to rule out the potential bias of being based on a few incidents. 
This also requires me to choose selectively among the many events, actions and policies. The 
separation into two periods will also facilitate to point out any major developments, changes 
or patterns. 
 
This thesis is a single-case study requiring a qualitative research. The method that I will apply 
is document analysis as observation and interview is not applicable or practical. I will analyze 
documents such as Israeli state archives, the biographies of key Israeli decision-makers, 
analytical work conducted by political scientist and accounts of historians as well as journalist 
works. The goal is to achieve a broad and nuanced document selection consisting of primary, 
secondary and tertiary documents. I will be limited by the requirements of the thesis and by 
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what is physically available to me.
3
 In the method chapter will explain more of the features of 
qualitative method and document analysis and how I intend to apply it for this thesis.  
 
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
In chapter two, I explain in greater detail, my rationale for choosing Bull’s theory and the 
theory in itself. The theoretical concepts of Bull’s Institutions, Balance of Power, 
International Law, War, Diplomacy and Great Powers provide the basis for my theoretical 
indicators which I present in the document analysis.  
 
The third chapter explains the method I have applied to conduct this research, my process of 
selecting the document material and how I have done my best to maintain validity and 
reliability in the process of selection and analysis.  
The fourth chapter contains the relevant historical background to provide the reader with a 
better understanding of the case, the context of the research and the document selection.  
 
The fifth chapter marks the beginning of the analysis as I bring theory and method together to 
derive the relevant data from the document selection. While separating the document data 
from my opinions, this operation requires interpretation to indicate how I perceive those data 
before analyzing further. I begin the chapter by explaining how I will apply Bull’s institutions 
as theoretical indicators to reveal Israel’s relationship to the framework of values, norms, 
rules and practices of international society.  
 
In chapter six I draw upon my document analysis, conducting a discussion aimed at 
answering the research questions, looking at how Israel’s relationship to the values, rules, 
norms and practices enabled and restrained Israel’s actions.  
 
In chapter seven I seek to draw a conclusion upon the findings and make suggestions for 
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This chapter presents the theoretical framework for the thesis; which links the research 
question with data gathering and analysis. A fitting theoretical frame enables a good 
analysis of the document selection. After I have justified my choice of theory, I will 
explain its contents. I have chosen Hedley Bull`s conception of the international society 
which is upheld by a common need for order. Order in Bull`s international society is 
provided by five institutions that enable the established rules norms and practices of 
international society. I will define and explain so that the reader may better understand 
the choice of data selection.  
 
2.1 Choosing Bull 
Hedley Bull’s conception of the international society as the theoretical framework for 
analyzing this case is legitimized partly by the limitations of competing international 
relation paradigms. Realism sees international relations as directly linked with the 
fundamentally selfish human nature in which conflict and competition is unavoidable. 
States are the primary actors driven by self-interest and survival in an international 
anarchy. The international realm is anarchical as states are sovereign with no external 
authority and hence, are in a constant state of war. In Realism, the absence of war and 
conflict can only be explained by a balance of power. Realism views interstate relations 
as potentially positive for short term selfish gain, but is primarily skeptical about any 
cooperation. In Realism, states must fend for themselves and Realism is therefore not be 
the right tool to provide our case with the answers we seek.4 
 
Kenneth Waltz is arguably the most influential neorealist. His book “Theory of 
International Politics” from 1979 is fundamental to the neorealist paradigm. As in classic 
Realism states are the sovereign and primary actors in an international anarchy. 
However in Neorealism, states are also rational actors seeking maximum utility among 
different options, weighing gains against costs. Though they differ in capabilities and 
distribution of power the outcomes follow a predictable pattern, according to Waltz. In 
Neorealism, which Waltz calls system theory, the structure of the international system 
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of states will determine the optimal course of action and prescribe behavior. War and 
conflict occur when states seek their national interest within the anarchy, but it can be 
avoided provided with a functioning, preferably bi-polar, balance of power. Waltz is not 
saying that balance cannot fail; he states simply that a bi-polar balance is the preferred 
condition in bringing stability. Sometimes internal conditions may cause a state not to 
keep balance, for which its security and prosperity will suffer. Stanley Hoffman points 
out the lack of multipolar considerations. “Concerned almost exclusively with the `state of 
war`, Waltz, in discussing the international system, does not go beyond a binary 
classification – bipolar versus multipolar systems.”5  
Referring to what he calls reductionist theory Waltz argued, that to focus on the 
behavior of the parts is insufficient.6 “The international system, if conceived at all, is taken 
to be merely an outcome.”7 Waltz contends that international politics can only be 
understood if the effects of structure upon actors are taken into consideration. System 
theory explains the organization of the realm as the international system constraining 
and disposing the units within it. This gives some predictability of behavior that enables 
survival and prospering.8 
 
Neorealism introduces the view of states seeking relative gains in accordance with 
structure. It takes into consideration the hierarchical placement of states and their 
different capabilities. It can be complimented by unit-level analysis to provide better 
understanding. 9  But it never claimed to be, nor sought to be, a theory that could explain 
the developments of a particular state’s policy. To Waltz, this is the same with all 
balance-of-power theory. “To expect it to do so would be like expecting the theory of 
universal gravitation to explain the wayward path of a falling leaf. A theory at one level of 
generality cannot answer questions about matters at a different level of generality.”10 
Neorealism can contribute with some expected outcomes based on the general rules of 
its international system, but this is not enough to provide us with the basis for the 
analysis we seek as it do not pay attention to the framework of rules norms and shared 
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understandings on which the international society depends.”11 Waltz`s structural scope 
is too general for the kind of case analysis I wish to conduct and deals mostly with the 
structural restraints on rational state interaction. It might be worthwhile having a look 
at what other theorists can offer. Could such unit-level analysis, as it is branded by 
Waltz, complete the picture?  
 
Graham T. Allison used the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 to develop three models as tools 
for creating competing explanations for a given foreign policy. The Rational Action 
Model (Model I) sees governmental actions as the actions a rational man would adopt to 
achieve his ends, choosing the biggest payoff. Assuming the state is a unitary actor this 
can be applied to understand the actions of a given state. It is arguably an unrealistic 
comparison as an individual man may lack the perfect information to make rational 
choices. But states are not individual men, rather clusters of organizations that also act 
on imperfect information and limited time in accordance to procedures. To provide a 
base for improved explanation and prediction Allison added model II and III as 
alternatives. 
The Organizational Process Model (Model II) sees decisions as the products of 
government department routines. Tasks are distributed to different organizations 
within the state.  Each organization is expected to fulfill certain tasks, and will have 
defined operating procedures in acquiring information, defining options, and 
implementing programs. The organizations rely on previous experience and even 
previous orders to complete task regardless if that was the intent of those giving orders. 
Through identifying the relevant organizations and the displayed pattern of 
organizational behavior, events can be explained. This model may shed light on some of 
the actions that cannot be mapped out in the Rational Action Model.  
The Governmental Politics model (Model III) sees state action as a result of bargaining 
games among key players in the national government. The analyst must focus on how 
the key players influenced the decision in question, what were the key player’s 
perceptions, what established channels were available for creating competing 
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preferences, and how the players performed. In this model all government action is a 
result of bargaining among players that are organized in a hierarchy. 12 
 
Allison’s three models provide three conceptual frameworks for analyzing foreign 
policy. However it is not the purpose of my analysis to conduct an analysis of foreign 
policy development alone. I wish to understand how the particular state of Israel 
maneuvered in relation to the international realm for the achievement of its goals in the 
period of 1955-1974, and how this affected its relation to Africa. Insight on the 
bureaucratic process and the bargaining among key players provide an image of how 
internal processes gave a certain outcome but do not provide an explanation of how 
interaction with other states and the international arena in general shaped policy and 
events. The Rational Actor model alone does not give a sufficiently nuanced insight on 
Israel’s interaction with its surroundings as states do not always act “rationally” as a 
unified actor seeking maximum payoff. Furthermore this model does not provide a 
sufficient understanding of what would be the rational choice while it does not try to 
explain the functioning’s and dynamics of the international further than seeing states as 
rational actors acting upon imperfect information.13 
  
Unlike Waltz, Allison’s models take no external structural considerations in explaining a 
state’s relations to the international. There is no attempt to explain how structure affects 
the development of a state’s foreign policy or its international politics. What the models 
can in fact explain requires much information and detailed insight. Hence his models are 
better at analyzing specific actions or events, as snapshots of history shot through three 
different filters, provided the researcher has sufficient information. For our analysis 
over a 20 year period, one could in theory make many such snapshots attempting to 
make a film. Each shot would represent individual cases, demanding massive amounts of 
insight on each model of analysis. The almost insurmountable data that would entail 
aside, Allison’s focus on specific events does not explain how and why international 
relations are possible to begin with and the greater context of the state’s relation 
towards the international. Waltz also criticizes the models, arguing that Allison confuses 
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foreign policy as international politics. Only the first model is in fact a study in 
international politics, while the others, changing actor from state to bureaucratic and 
individual unit, is foreign policy under the realm of national politics.14  
 
Methodologically, Allison has been criticized for simplifying the rational actor’s model. 
His models are criticized as not being models at all, rather analogies or meta-theories 
that generate no prediction or hypothesis and hence are not falsifiable. The models have 
also been criticized for not being easily separable as well as deterministic upon the 
evidence. Allison also varies in his metaphysic, epistemology and classification system 
throughout his analysis and weavers between the contextual and deductive form of 
analysis. In spite all this Allison’s models still have great of explanatory power and 
provide useful insight in many cases where information is easily accessible.15 
 
Waltz’s structural theory alone is too broad and limits the understanding of state 
interaction to the mere structural restraints. Allison’s focused analysis is to narrow 
providing insight mostly on internal processes, but offer little understanding of 
international relations beyond the rational choice of a unitary state actor. For the 
purpose of this thesis we need a more manageable tool that envelops structural 
considerations whilst taking into consideration the individual context of the state we are 
analyzing. Having explored what may seem the extremes on the “ladder of 
abstraction”,16 from the external system forces all the way down to key-individual 
psychology and performance, I would like to explain why Hedley Bull conception of the 
international society and his focus on the state-actors relationship to international 
institutions is applicable for this case where I investigate Israel’s relationship to the 
established rules norms and practices of the state society.  
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2.2 Hedley Bull’s International society 
 
Bull’s theory and definitions are presented here in its essence and aimed at answering 
my research question; focusing mainly the central concepts of the theory. I will 
complement Bull’s theory with contributions from Michael Waltzer in regards to the 
principle of “just war”, and Alan James in regards to the principle of sovereignty.17 
 
Order in Social life 
Hedley Bull argued that order is a fundamental condition for the basic elemental or 
primary values of all social life; life, truth and property. The primary value; “life” means 
the security from violence. ”Truth” is ensured through the keeping of promises and by 
ensuring that agreements are fulfilled. “Property” is secured through creating a stable 
possession of things free from constant challenge.18 “By order in social life I mean a 
pattern of human activity that sustains elementary, primary or universal goals of social life 
such as these. “19 
 
International order through international society 
According to Bull any social life, including the modern international system, builds on 
some pattern sustaining the mentioned elemental values. “By International order I mean 
a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, 
or international society.”20 Bull defines a state as an independent political community 
that possesses government and sovereignty over a territory and people. A system of 
states is established when; two or more states have sufficient contact between them to 
impact on each other’s decisions, becoming part of one another’s calculations.21 Bull 
argues that the reality of the modern international system is interaction beyond that of 
states simply calculations action and in accordance to each other. “A society of states (or 
international society) exist when a group of states, conscious of certain common interest 
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and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound 
by a common set of rules in their relation with one another, and share in the working of 
common institutions.”22 The states form a society based on common rules, norms and 
practices that enable the mutual interest of enabling the elemental values through 
common rules and institutions. Bull argues that there has always been an element of 
society in the modern international system.  
 
Bull’s theory is partly built on the perception that there are three main traditions of 
international relations; Realist (Hobbesian), Revolutionist (Kantian) and the Rationalist 
(Grotian) traditions. Realist tradition view international politics as the state of war in a 
system of states, where the interest of one state excludes the interest of another. The 
Revolutionist tradition sees international relations as the potential arena for creating a 
community of mankind in a transnational world society where the most typical 
international activity is transnational ideological conflict that eventually overthrows the 
state system becoming a universal state. The Rationalist tradition see international 
relations as a rule governed international society. Rationalist tradition agrees with the 
Realist tradition that the members of international society are principally states, not 
individual men. But it is not ideological conflict or a state of war which dominates 
international activity, rather social and economic interaction and cooperation. Rules and 
institutions and common values and interest limit the Hobbesian state of war. The states 
also relate to morality and law, but moral imperatives do not overthrow the state system 
as mutual respect for sovereignty enables the international society.23 Bull argues that 
while international order is best maintained by securing the elemental values through 
an international society, the modern international system reflects all three traditions. In 
different locations, historical periods and policies, one of these may predominate the 
others without elimination of the other two. International society competes with the 
other two basic elements of modern international politics, state of war and transnational 
solidarity and conflict. International events must therefore not be interpreted as if 
international society was the only element.24 With that consideration in mind, this thesis 
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will through document analysis look closer at Israel’s behavior in the modern 
international system in the period between 1955 and 1974. Behavior that cannot be 
explained as serving international society may be explained by a Realist or Revolutionist 
perception. 
 
International Society as Anarchy 
Bull pointed to the way established norms, rules, shared understandings and mutual 
expectations influenced and shaped power politics. He did not agree with what he calls 
the “domestic analogy” that had been used to describe international relations by many 
theorists in the field. This analogy based itself on the “state of nature” concept by 
Thomas Hobbes described in his book Leviathan of 1651. In this “state of nature” 
individual men fight for survival without the protection of a central power. The analogy 
indicates how the individual states interact in the international anarchy towards one 
another, under the lack of central authority in a constant state of war. Constant state of 
war is also the disposition or readiness for war. Though agreeing with the concept of the 
international realm as an anarchy lacking central authority, Bull argued that states do 
not need central government like individual men to survive. Anarchy is tolerable in the 
international realm in a way that among individuals it is not.25 Though the states are in 
constant disposition to war, security issues do not exhaust the state as it would the 
individual man. Security is provided by the state and enables the other refinements of 
life. For a state, violent attacks are easier to defend, than for individual men. Insecurity is 
not equally distributed among states, as great states are safer than smaller ones. Among 
men this is not necessarily the case. The economy of states also provides them with an 
economic self-sufficiency individuals do not have. All in all, states can tolerate a looser 
form of society among them than within state. Bull points out that there have always 
been elements of society in the modern international system. Mutual interest, a sense of 
community, habit, will and apathy also play part.26 
 
Institutions 
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In the international society, states are responsible for the functions that make rules 
effective i.e. states are the principal institutions of the society of states. States make or 
legislates the rules by giving consent to them. The rules are communicated through state 
action and official statements. Rules of international society are administered by the 
state through executive acts of the state itself or international organizations responsible 
to it. 
States are also rule-enforcers while there is no central government. This may involve use 
of force to defend legal, moral or operational rights. Because states differ in ability to 
defend these rights, enforcement of rules is uncertain. States protect the rules by 
maintaining the conditions of the system where respect for the rules can flourish.27 “In 
carrying out these functions, states collaborate with one another, in varying degrees, in 
what may be called the institutions of international society: the balance of power, 




2.2.1 Balance of Power 
 
Definitions 
Bull quotes Vattel when defining “the balance of power” as; “a state of affairs such that no 
one power is in a position where it is predominant and can lay down the law to others.'29  
 
Bull makes several theoretical distinctions on balance of power, three of which are more 
relevant for this thesis. By “simple balance of power” Bull means balance among to 
powers that require equal distribution of power such that if one is falling behind it must 
strengthen its efforts to regain balance. “Complex balance of power” is balance among 
three powers or more, and don't require equally distributed power because it allows for 
alliances. Bull claims that while there was in the 1950’s simple balance, the 1960’s was a 
time of transition. In the 1970’s it took the form of a complex balance. Another 
distinction must be made on general or local balance of power. A “general balance of 
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power” is simply the absence of a preponderate power, and -” local or particular balance 
of power” is either limited to a geographical area or segment of the system. I also want to 
bring attention to the difference between the dominant and subordinate balance of 
power. The dominant balance of power exists between the most powerful states can be 
exemplified by cold-war US and Soviet. Balance of power existing locally in for instance 
Asia or the Middle-East is a subordinate balance to the dominant balance.  
 
Functions in international order 
A general balance of power throughout the international system prevents predominant 
powers from achieving a universal empire. Local balance of power prevents the 
predominant power of the region from absorbing or dominating the smaller states. 
Together; general and local balance of power provides the conditions for the other 
institutions of international society to exist. Its main function is not to preserve peace 
but the system of states itself. Balance of power must therefore at times disregard 
international law to create the conditions that enable the institution of international law, 
as the interest of order is prior to the interest of law, smaller nations, and the keeping of 
peace. Balance of power is the fundamental institution of international society and order. 
It tends to favor the great powers that from time to time absorb or partition of smaller 
states as the needs of the dominant balance come before that of the subordinate balance. 
War fought to maintain the dominant balance does not depend on the legal legitimacy of 
international law that other wars require. Balance of powers fundamental role makes it 
prior to that of law.30 “The chief function of the balance of power, however is not to 
preserve peace, but to preserve the system of states itself. Preservation of the balance of 
power requires war, when this is the only means whereby the power of a potentially 
dominant state can be checked.”31 
 
Bull describes the mutual nuclear deterrence existing between United States of America 
(USA) and the Soviet Union helped preserve nuclear peace as nuclear war became an 
irrational option. It also prevented non-nuclear hostilities in fear of a nuclear escalation. 
This stabilization of the dominant balance contributed to the general balance. Bull does 
not explain how the acquisition of nuclear weapons of a smaller state impacts the 
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dominant balance or the local balance of that state. As the local balance is subordinated 
to the dominating balance it is not unreasonable to assume that the local state in 
question would be forced to compliance or be destroyed for the greater good of the 




2.2.2. International law 
 
Definition  
“International law may be regarded as a body of rules, which binds states and other agents 
in world politics in their relations with one another and is considered to have the status of 
law.”33 International law govern the mutual interaction of states and other agents such 
as individual humans, groups, international or intergovernmental organizations, that are 
all subjects of international law with rights and duties. These rules are by all agents 
regarded as binding on one another. International law exists without the threat of force 
from central government as coercion and force is delivered decentralized by the 
individual members of the society according to principles of self-help, using reprisal and 
war. It can be exercised by the victim of the violation or by other states coming to its aid, 
often centralized as the will of collective security mechanisms such as the UN. The 
effectiveness of international law depends on a functioning balance of power.34  
 
Functions in international order 
International law identifies as a supreme normative principle the idea of a society of 
sovereign states. International law provides the basic rules of coexistence among states, 
restricting violence, establishing the rules and conditions of agreements, and cementing 
the principles of sovereignty and independence. It also facilitates mobilization of 
compliance with the rules. Combining restriction of violence and the mobilizing for 
compliance when law is broken offers a paradox. So what is a just cause for war (jus ad 
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bellum)? Morality is a language of justification, and what is cruelty and what is justice is 
essentially within the world of discourse. Political philosopher Michael Waltzer argues 
that; “..if I claim that I am fighting justly I must also claim that I was attacked (..), or 
threatened with attack, or that I am coming to the aid of a victim of someone else’s 
attack.”35 Interpretation and perception may also lead way for hypocrisy, and Waltzer 
warns that the hypocrite will be judged by those who are not. Waltzer also adds that 
massacres within sovereign states such as the Cambodian genocide 1975 to 1979, is also 
jus ad bellum for interventional war.36 
 
Another paradox arise when we take into consideration that  International Law is to 
cement the principle of sovereignty, while sometimes mobilizing and disregarding it 
when creating compliance for the rules. Alan James, another important contributor to 
the English School like Bull, defines a state as sovereign when it possesses the sufficient 
capacity to participate in international relations, which it can only do if it has what he 
calls constitutional independence. Sovereignty is a legal condition as it is based on the 
state’s constitution that has the force of law. James argues that international law 
presupposes sovereignty as it only applies to sovereign states, regulating their mutual 
relations. Sovereignty is absolute and cannot exist in degrees. A state may be weak 
politically but that does not change its constitutional status which either is or is not.37 
Sovereignty is also unitary, meaning no other entity can take decisions on “(…) the 
internal or the external affairs of the territory in question.”38 A sovereign state may be 
adherent to powerful states and is also free to pass over to organizations or other states 
legal rights to take decision that are binding on the sovereign state, but the decision 
always lay with the sovereign state itself. Like international law, the principle 
sovereignty must sometimes yield in overriding concerns of preserving order. Unless 
the state’s constitution is completely absolved, and its state territory is absorbed by 
another state under its constitutional scheme, the state remains sovereign even when 
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Rules will certainly not be followed at all times, if they were, they'd be unnecessary. 
Conformity may come partly by habit, as an extension of following the rules from 
internal processes, by seeing international law as valuable in itself or as part of a wider 
set of values, or obligatory as legally required. Obedience can come from coercion or by 
threat of it, or by the acceptance of mutual gain in preservation of rules, or general 
acceptance by the parties of the values and goals underlying the agreement. These 
factors exist independently of legal commitments and create the foundation under which 
legal commitments can operate. The order-conforming functions of international law are 
more important than the existence of the laws themselves.40 
 
Often but not always, rules will be disregarded if they do not match self-interests. A 
breach of law may be done by a state that has previously respected the law or rule in 
question, and that conforms to other rules of international law. Making the breach of law 
some sort of exception from state practice, the state may still respect the same rule of 
law in other or later occasions hoping to rebuild trust from its surroundings. What is 
violation and what is conformity is subject to interpretation of rules and construction of 
facts. Violation of agreements may also be attempts to preserve and restore an 
agreement that actions from other actors put into challenge. Regardless of the true 
intent, the offending party tends to display that it does in fact respect the rule by denying 
the breach, or by attempting to legitimize the action by referring to some goal or 
principle of overriding importance. The cause given is not as important as the state's 
need to give one. Lack of conformity to rules is not as problematic as a lack of legitimacy 
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Bull defines diplomacy in its broadest sense as; “The conduct or relations between states 
and other entities in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means.”41  
Bull focus on the conduct of relations in world politics by persons who are official agents 
of a state or another recognized entity. By other entities of world politics Bull refers to 
political entities such as the UN or other international general organizations or regional 
international organizations. Political organizations may choose representatives for 
negotiation although they are not recognized as states. Traditionally, diplomacy has also 
been made with vassal states or other regional representatives not recognized as 
representing legitimate states, but the core diplomacy is that of official relationships 
between sovereign states.42  
 
Diplomacy presupposes the existence of an international system where parts interact 
under no central authority. In its current institutionalized form it presupposes the 
existence of international society, as it is made possible only by acceptance of complex 
rules of conventions.  The diplomatic mission may not interfere with the internal affairs 
of its host and the host must respect the diplomatic immunity of the diplomats, their 
staff, their mission and communication, allowing them to operate free of constraint as a 
part of maintaining continual negotiation; an elemental task of diplomacy.43 
 
Functions in international order 
First and foremost Diplomacy facilitates communication between state leaders and 
other entities in world politics as messengers protected by immunity. Immunity of 
envoys and the sovereignty of their extra-territorial mission enable free communication. 
Secondly it facilitates the negotiating of agreements by finding the field of overlapping 
interest, using reason and persuasion to bring this to the attention of the parts. 
Diplomacy therefore can only succeed if the states involved see foreign policy as the 
rational pursuit of interest, where interest can be, at least at times, mutual.44 “Diplomacy 
can play no role where foreign policy is conceived as the enforcement of a claim to 
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universal authority, the promotion of the true faith against heretics, or as the pursuit of 
self-regarding interests that take no account of the interest of others.”45 Thirdly, gathering 
information or intelligence of other states and developments in the world is paramount 
for shaping good external policies. Diplomats will often be held from obtaining some 
information whilst being exposed to other information by its host state in order to give 
them a certain impression. A fourth function is the minimizing of friction in international 
relations. When common interest clash tension must be sought avoided as maintaining 
good relations is important. Tact and modesty along with persuasion and reasoning can 
be applied for advancing or defending the view of the state and people one represent. 
Threats must be avoided as drawing attention to common interest is often more fruitful. 
Being truthful must not come at the expense of being sensitive to what might offend as 
such is harmful to relations. The final task of diplomacy, according to Bull is to symbolize 
the very existence of an international society. Diplomatic relations presuppose a mutual 
recognition of rights and sovereignty, equality and independence.46 
 
In periods of low consensus in international society, tact and intelligence can be replaced 
by 'political warfare', 'loudspeaker diplomacy' and 'diplomacy by insult'. Such hostile 
diplomacy is not aimed at their counterpart in attempting to find common ground for 







“War is organized violence carried on by political units against each other.”48 Bull defines 
war in its strict sense war as only waged by sovereign states, and only this kind of 
international war has been legitimate in the modern state system. The sovereign state 
has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. War in the material sense differs from war 
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in the normative legal sense. The former is the actual hostilities; the latter is when state 
of affairs is brought about legally through a declaration of war. Actual war happens quite 
often without there being a normative war, and in some cases due to the lack of peace 
declaration there might be normative war with no material war. Material war is harder 
to define than the normative war. When is a blockade an act of violence, and when is a 
rebel band a political unit? Nevertheless, when engaged in material activity called war 
strict rules of conduct apply to the same degree as if it was normative declared.49 
 
Functions in international order 
In the international society war functions as both an instrument and a threat. War 
manifests disorder bringing with it the threat of international society breakdown. As an 
instrument of state policy war shape the international system by enforcing international 
law, preserving the balance of power and even promoting just changes in law. Restriction 
of war is a goal, not just because it’s a threat to the international society, but because 
states are bound by common rules and institutions and therefore war cannot be fought 
for just any given reason. War can be restricted by limiting what war conduct is allowed. 
The geographical spread of war must be restricted by respecting rights and duties of 
neutral states. 50 Legitimate causes for war must also be restricted, as it is today through 
the UN charter.51 However, international society depend on war as means for 
enforcement of international law, which can only be enforced if states are willing and 
capable to raise arms in order to do so. Preservation of balance of power requires war, or 
the threat of it, in order to avoid the emergence of a preponderate state. Bringing about 
“just” change may also require war, as peaceful change mechanisms can be lacking or 
inefficient. Consensus to provide change through war, or rather, the lack of protest 
against a violent change may be seen in the international society if there is a feeling that 
the change is just. 52 
  
With the spread of nuclear weapons it was argued that war could no longer shape the 
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characteristics of the international system and enforce international law in the same way 
as before, as nuclear war is not the continuation of policy but the breakdown of it. But as 
Bull argues; war or the threat of it has not lost all political utility. The presence of nuclear 
weapons affects conflicts of non-nuclear states by ending them quickly. Bull used Israel 
and its wars with its Arab neighbors (1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973) as an example that 
war and the threat of war had not outplayed its political role after the introduction of 
mutual nuclear deterrence in the dominating balance. War by smaller powers must be 
fast and avoid or postpone great power intervention or otherwise limit the effectiveness 
or ability of great powers to intervene, and to make due if great powers cuts arms-
supplies. For a nuclear power to attack a non-nuclear power with nuclear weapons is 
irrational as the international reaction for such an act would outweigh most gains. Hence 
such threats are not efficient, other than for deterring attacks. Bull refers to Israel, South 
Africa and Australia as potential nuclear powers that argue for such deterring 
application against attacks from non-nuclear powers, superior in numbers. As discussed 
above, Bull saw mutual nuclear deterrence as a means of stabilizing the dominating 
balance and hence the general balance. Even in a nuclear balance force may still be used 
in foreign policy between those powers if conditions can be somehow agreed upon. Fear 
of escalation towards nuclear measures, deters much direct confrontation. Threats of 
force do have political influence if one side seems more resolved in the use of it than the 
other. Such “brinkmanship” or “crisis management” was successfully demonstrated by 
the USA in the Cuba crisis, revealing that nuclear weapons have not made war irrelevant 
as an institution.53 “The range of political objects war can serve has become narrower, the 
cost of resorting to it greater.”54  
 
 
2.2.5 The Great Powers 
 
Definitions 
Bull defines great powers as two or more powers existing together as a club with a rule 
of membership. A state defined as a great power must belong to the elite of international 
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military capability, comparable to each other in strength. The dynamics changed 
somewhat with nuclear weapons. Powers that previously could defend themselves 
without allies against the world was now vulnerable like they had not been before. Bull 
points out that no state can “.. prevent the other power from attacking. In this sense no 
state today can assure its own security unilaterally.”55 Deterrence, resolving conflicts, and 
arms control agreements can reduce the risk of such attacks. Middle and small powers, 
can manage their own security for periods of time without allies, but their success 
depends on the maintenance of the general balance of power, unlike great powers that 
are less fragile. Great powers enjoy special rights and duties which are recognized 
internally by their people and leaders as well as externally by their surroundings. They 
have a right to take part in determining key issues affecting peace and security of the 
international system and they have a duty to modify their policy in accordance with their 
managerial responsibilities. The concept of great powers, presuppose the idea of an 
international society bound by common rules and institutions, interaction and contact.  
Bull identifies only the USA and the Soviet Union as great powers in 1945. At the time of 
writing in 1977 he also considered China to be a great power, while Japan had potential 
to become one. Britain, France and Germany were inferior middle powers or secondary 
powers throughout 1955-1974. What is clear is that possessing strategic nuclear 
weapons is not sufficient for great power membership.56 
 
Functions in international order 
The inequality of states enables the great power to assert force in the contribution to 
international order. Great powers can use their strength to maintain international order 
through preserving the general balance of power and avoid, contain or limit conflicts and 
war with each other. The great powers can exploit their local preponderance, respect 
each other’s sphere of influence, and take part in joint action, all aimed at contributing to 
international order. Great powers can like smaller powers work to promote the opposite 
goals, creating disorder if they for some reason find it fruitful. 57 Bull lists six main 
functions of great powers in maintain order. 
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First, balance of power the precondition of the system of states is best preserved by 
great powers by managing their relations to each other. This provides the basis for the 
recognition of their special rights and duties. 
Secondly by avoiding and controlling crisis great powers provide order. Recognizing that 
crisis can be constructive, the avoidance of it is essential to great power management. 
Also when closely associated with opposing parts of a conflict great powers seek to 
restrain their respective associates. Conflict is also avoided in the development and 
respect of operational rules for each other’s spheres of influence. 
Thirdly, limitation of war is also a great powers task in their collaboration for order. 
Other than maintaining the general balance of power, and avoiding and controlling 
conflict, great powers seek effective communication to avoid miscalculation, accident or 
misinterpretation. They use negotiation to settle political disputes among themselves 
and limit arms race. Great powers limit conflicts amongst smaller powers, and if conflict 
occurs they limit the geographical spread of conflicts and end them quickly.58 
 
As a forth feature great powers can further maintain order by exercising local 
preponderance. Through “dominance” a great power can use habitual force on the lesser 
states, disregarding rights of sovereignty, independence and equality of the states. Force 
or threat of force can be used, but not habitual and unlimited as other means are 
preferable due to the political cost. Violations of equality, liberty and sovereignty can be 
justified by overriding principles.59 “In so doing they reflect the primacy of norms of order 
over norms of justice in the positive law and practice of international society.”60 
5. By agreeing on spheres of influence and hence reducing friction, great powers 
contribute to international order. Distinction must be made on recognition of 
preponderance and recognition of moral and legal rights in an area. “A sphere of 
influence, moreover, which in one country's view exists as a matter of right, may in another 
country's view exist only as a matter of fact.”61 Great powers may see each other having 
rights by operational rules of the game. This in turn gives foundation for expectations of 
behavior that in a sense is a mutual recognition of rights. Some agreements can be made 
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by giving specific and limited rights to each other, keeping certain activities away from 
each other spheres.62 Unclear spheres of influence are not unusual as understandings 
are informal and tacit. By challenging each other’s sphere through struggle and 
competition spheres of influence are both established and changed.63 There are 
operational rules of conduct in regard to respecting other great power spheres of 
influence, such as prohibition of overflying other great powers territories, or prohibition 
of sabotage, arming subversive groups with nuclear arms, deploying offensive missiles in 
states close to competing great powers etc. Though great powers can follow these rules, 
it’s not necessarily so that leaders are conscious of them or that there is an actual 
agreement on these. The precise content of operational rules is hard to identify.64  
6. Great Powers can contribute to order by promoting common policies in the 
international system. 
 
Great powers need to preserve this legitimacy or consent of their special role, as it’s the 
only way in which they can fulfill their managerial functions. Great powers must also 
avoid responsibility for disorderly acts as order is prior to justice, and undermining both 
will mean loss of support. In addition great powers should try to meet some of the 
demands for “just” change in their policy. If demands can’t be met, attempting to do so 
must be done regardless as not to lose support. The responsibility of great powers 
prevents them from ignoring such demands. In some areas secondary powers greatly 
affect the political position of the great power. Such secondary powers can wisely be 
brought in as partners of the regional management of balance as well as partners in the 
global management, to avoid the potential threats of middle powers uniting against 
great power arrogance.65 
 
Theoretical indicators 
The theoretical framework provides the thesis with theoretical indicators for each 
institution.  
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On Balance of Power, I look at Israel’s relationship to the local balance of power 
considerations as subordinated the general balance of power. I also look at Israel’s use of 
deterrence in this respect. In regards to International Law I investigate how Israel acted 
towards the principles of state sovereignty, the keeping of agreements and the 
restriction of violence. On Diplomacy this thesis focuses on how Israel related to the 
diplomatic arena in general. How did it use communication and negotiation? As for 
Israel’s relationship to the institution of War we know that war can be both a threat to 
international society as well as a means of preserving of it. What can Israel’s material 
war conduct be said to be in this period, and what reasoning was used to legitimize its 
actions? In relation to the institution of Great Powers I will look at how the great powers 
managed their relationship in the region. How did Israel act as the great powers; 
managed their relations, establishing and competing for spheres of influence and using 
their local preponderance to stop and limit war? These indicators are contextualized 





In this chapter I have explained my choice of theory; Hedley Bull supplemented with 
Alan James and Michael Waltzer. I have mapped out the main features of Bull`s theory 
and the institutions of international society. Using these features I have shaped broad 
indicators which can revealed how Israel acted in accordance to the rules, norms and 
practices of international society. We now have the tool for conducting a qualitative 
research using document analysis. The following chapter explains my choice of method 
and a definition of what qualitative research is. I also explain my reason for choosing 





As this thesis is a single case study of political historical events I will start by explaining 
why I think a qualitative research design using document analysis is the best way 
forward for my analysis. I will then go on to explain the document selection process. I 
will also review the limitations of the document selection, its validity and reliability. 
 
3.1 Qualitative Research Design  
Choosing a research design is to make a plan for how the analysis is to be conducted. My 
research problem calls for a qualitative research design as it allows for an in-depth 
analysis, looking closer at processes and meanings which cannot be measured in 
quantity or frequency. 
Through qualitative methods of observation, interview and text analysis we can 
investigate smaller selections of cases and get closer to informants than we are able to 
through quantitative research is able to. A qualitative research design provides a basis 
for understanding social phenomena’s through thorough data of persons and situations. 
The method of observation is not applicable to historical cases, and I do not have access 
to relevant interview objects. This thesis will therefore be based on a broad and nuanced 
document selection.  
 
A neutral interpretation of the documents is important for achieving a valid analysis. 
This is complicated as we cannot describe and categorize events without infusing them 
with meaning. It is therefore often difficult to achieve the perfect understanding of what 
was actually meant. The subjective nature of the qualitative method also requires 
careful ethical considerations. The researcher may be overly influenced by some sources 
through the analysis. As I have been exposed to the very personal writing style of many 
key decision-makers biographies I have had to reflect upon that possibility. The 
researcher is also in danger of influencing the research with his or hers respective, 
inherent opinions or persuasions, something I also have kept in mind. The qualitative 
research process is flexible, allowing the researcher to work on different parts of the 
research process simultaneously. This is crucial when collecting, analyzing and 
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interpreting because it enables the process of gathering data to be adapted towards the 
most relevant findings for the thesis.66   
 
3.2 Document Analysis  
 
Using the appropriate theoretical frame, document analysis can be used to uncover 
different processes. For instance; uncovering political agendas, or norms and practices 
within organizations, changes within networks or the establishment of power relations, 
or developments in national and ethnic identities. Document analysis can also reveal 
stability and change in decision-makers opinions on social and political matters and 
techniques of power usage.67 As the research problem dictates, we are interested in 
uncovering Israel`s relations to established norms and practices of the society of states 
from 1955 to 1974. I will divide the data into two ten year periods, 1955-1964 and 
1965-1974 in order extract data more evenly without focusing too much on particular 
events, providing us with a more complete set of data. Each period is analyzed by using 
the theoretical frame of Hedley Bull`s five institutions of international order. Each 
institution had its own features of contribution to the international order.68 The relevant 
features will be used as indicators within each of the two periods to reveal Israel`s 
relationship to the rules, norm and practices in general. These indicators are presented 
in the introduction of the analysis.  
 
Documents must, for analytical purposes, be divided into three categories; primary, 
secondary and tertiary documents, based on author, level of access and for what 
audience it was meant. Primary documents are documents that have been circulated to a 
limited number of actors within a restricted forum, and often contain sensitive 
information. Secondary documents are in principle available to all, though not aimed at 
the general public, but still available to those interested. Tertiary documents are also 
available to all, but are characterized by being written in order to shed light on a specific 
                                                        
66 Thaagaard, Tove: Systematikk og Innlevelse – En innføring i kvalitativ metode, (OZGraf SA: 
Fagbokforlaget Vigmostad & Bjørke AS, 2002) p 11-23. 
  Lynggaard, Kenneth: Kvalitative Metoder – En Grundbok. Sven Brinkmann & Lena Tanggaard. (red.) (Hans 
Reitzels Forlag, Kjøbenhavn 2010). 
67
 Lynggaard, Kenneth: Kvalitative Metoder – En Grundbok. Sven Brinkmann & Lena Tanggaard. (red.) (Hans 
Reitzels Forlag, Kjøbenhavn 2010) p 137. ” 
68
 Hedley Bull: The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) 
28 
 
situation or incident. Memoirs, biographies, journalistic and academic articles, reports 
or books are examples of tertiary documents that offer analytical insight into events and 
situations after they have occurred. The contexts in which a document was written, at 
what particular time, and for whom it was meant are important factors to be aware of 
when analyzing. This thesis will be combining all three categories for a more nuanced 
analysis through a triangulation of source categories.69 
 
3.2.1 Literature review – Access and Limitations  
After my interest in Israel`s conduct in the international society was sparked by reading 
“The Unspoken Alliance” (2010) by former senior editor at “Foreign Affairs” and 
doctorate in modern history from Oxford University, Sasha Polakow-Suransky, I began 
the process of seeking out more literature on the field through the so-called snowball-
method. With “The Unspoken Alliance” as a “mother-document”, its references led to 
many other relevant documents.70 Using the snowball-method, the researcher in 
principle follows the references until it leads to no other references in order to obtain 
the complete document material. Much of the material is not available to me; for 
instance official documents that are only available physically in other states. Another 
limitation on the ability of investigating all references of the mother document is the 
limits imposed by the size of the master thesis and the timeframe for completion. This 
not only affects the source tracking of the mother document, but the entire document 
material investigation. Needless to say; there is a massive amount of material on Israel, 
its political and historical development. The researcher must therefore aim to choose 
the most relevant sources. Some are more central by covering the entire timeframe and 
offering expertise and useful insight. In this thesis sources are mostly written between 
1955 and 1974, or after in retrospect of that period.  
 
When seeking out relevant and central sources, the researcher must also make sure the 
document selection is nuanced representing several views. To represent the Israeli state 
perspective, both primary documents as well as tertiary documents such as biographies 
of key decision-makers will be relevant. For a nuanced analysis I wanted to use Israeli-
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critical historians that might bring forth other or competing facts and conditions. I also 
relied on secondary documents such as the analytical works of Professor Michal Brecher 
and Associate Professor Joel Peters.71 Some document material came from other 
sources. In regards to theory I received several suggestions for literature in the field by 
my supervisor Associate Professor Robinson. After reading up on competing 
perspectives, the choice fell on Hedley Bull`s concept of the International Society. 
Through a lecture held by Professor in history, Hilde Waage at UiT – The Arctic 
University of Norway in March 2013, my attention was drawn towards the Israeli State 
Archives.72 By also referring to herself as Israel critical at that lecture, her new book 
“Conflict and power politics in the Middle East” was a fitting counterweight to the 
perspective of the Israeli state and decision-makers.73 As the Israeli State Archives74 
available to me (at the time) only covers the period of 1956-1960, I used the historical 
documents available at the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMF) website to complete 
the timeframe until 1974. The IMF documents contain a selection of Israeli state records 
and diplomatic documents and are edited by Dr. Meron Medzini, covering the years 
1947-2001. 75 
 
3.3 Data reliability and validity 
Qualitative method requires that the data’s are reliable, and that they are of good quality. 
It is therefore crucial that I separate between what is data, and what is my interpretation 
of this data as a researcher during the document analysis. The document analysis 
consists mainly of paraphrases and direct quotations. By paraphrasing, interpretation is 
required which I must keep as neutral as possible. To create a sufficient flow of the text 
and to make clear my interpretation of the facts the document analysis is also part of the 
main analysis as opposed to a quantitative thesis that may keep its empirical segment 
completely apart from the analytical. A deeper analysis is conducted in the discussion, 
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separated from the document analysis, clearly stated as my perception of the facts that 
are derived from the documents.  
 
The data I have chosen also need to be valid, meaning relevant for the research I am 
conducting. I have explained the validity of my central sources in the literature review in 
accordance to limitations, the need for a theoretical framework and the goal of a 
nuanced document selection. I have (to the best of my ability) tried to assure the 
reliability of the data I have gathered by reflecting on the authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness and meaning of the document material. The “authenticity” of the 
document depends on how likely it is that the document is of the origin and written by 
the author that it claims to be. If the source is less secure, like a blog or a webpage, 
reflections on its centrality to the analysis is always healthy. The “credibility” of a source 
is decided by the level of uncertainty or bias connected to the set of documents. Did the 
selection of a certain timeframe or a specific source or even several documents make the 
conclusion biased? I have already reflected upon the matter of Israel as special case, 
exploring the limits of norms, rules and practices of the international society of states. As 
for the timeframe it makes up a third of Israel’s lifetime. This is arguably the most 
dramatic 20 years of Israel`s existence, though there has certainly been turmoil, conflict 
and war in the remaining two thirds. Nevertheless, this does not represent a bias of the 
thesis but a deliberate consideration taken, conducted in the interest of gathering 
relevant data. 
As for the sources, I have explained how I have tried to maintain a nuanced document 
selection by triangulation the type of sources (primary, secondary and tertiary), and by 
balancing Israel-critical historians against Israeli state records and the memoirs of 
Israeli key decision-makers. In this thesis I have applied the use of footnotes, as direct 
sources in the text would make damage the flow of the document analysis chapter. The 
use of footnotes  also partly explain the large word count. 
 
On the matter of the document material being “representative” of the phenomenon, the 
change or break of discourse that we`re researching, we must find out to what degree 
the selection of documents is complete. I have done my best to make sure that the 
selection is complete, but the limitations of this analysis force me to choose that which is 
central and physically available. When reflecting on “meaning” we must consider the 
31 
 
language used in the documents, if it can be seen as unclear, vague or with several 
possible interpretations, and how we choose to interpret it. Technical terms or older 
language often pose challenges that we must be aware of. If there is obvious doubt on 




3.4 Ethical considerations 
Israeli statehood and its history, its conflicts in particular is in itself a sensitive matter to 
many, and any interpretation of history and events in this field are certain to offend one 
or several other views on the matter. That is not my intent. My aim is to make a neutral 
analysis based on a given theoretical framework and by using document analysis of a 
nuanced document material. As for myself I am certainly influenced by my western 
cultural perspective of history and as a student at a European university, schooled in a 
specific scientific tradition of thought. Norway has previously had a central mediating 
role in the Middle East, but has lately been critical of increased Israeli settlements in 
occupied territory and of other Israeli matters regarding the Palestinians. In addition the 
home town of my University, Tromsø, is a friendship town of Gaza. The Palestine issue 
receives a lot of national, as well as local, media attention. Locally the debate is quite 
influenced by the stance taken by Mads Gilbert, leader of the emergency medical 




In this chapter I have explained why I chose qualitative method and document analysis 
for the analysis of my research problem and how I selected the data material. I have 
aimed at avoiding bias through transparency and reflection throughout the analytical 
process, as well as by making sure that the data is reliable, authentic, credible, and to the 
best of my ability interpreted as intended by the writer. Using the theoretical framework 
of Bull`s institution that I mapped out in the theory chapter, I have identify Israel`s 
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relationship to the norms, rules and practices of the society of states in the document 
analysis. I have then conducted a discussion on the background of the analysis to answer 






In this chapter I`ll make an attempt to summarize the most relevant events and conditions 
regarding Israeli statehood and development from the beginning of the Zionist idea until the 
establishment of the state in 1948.  I will explain how Zionism came as a reaction to modern 
anti-Semitism and how the Jewish people came to seek a home in Palestine. I will explain 
how the British administration of the area came about, and how the British gave their promise 
to the Jews in the Belfour declaration which eventually led to the Israel`s claim for 
independence in 1948 as the British withdrew from their mandate. I’ll then map out the four 
Israeli-Arabic wars of this era, and the most important power dynamics relating to it. 
 
5.1 Anti-Semitism, Zionism and the Balfour declaration 
What we consider modern anti-Semitism, started with the assassination attempt on Tsar 
Aleksander II in Russia in 1866. The attempt weakened the liberal tendencies within Russia 
and the region. Nationalistic movements in Ukraine and the Slavic region grew forth using 
anti-Semitism to gain support. ―The Protocol of the Elders of Zion‖ was an anti-Semitic hoax 
that was used for the propaganda purposes of radicalizing and spreading anti-Semitism in 
Europe. This ―document‖ proved that a secret Jewish power was plotting to control the world. 
As the tsar was assassinated in 1881 massive anti-Semitism ―pogroms‖ was initiated, as 
destructive and murderous raids that were led against the Jews throughout Eastern Europe 
where Jewish houses were burned and their property seized. Soon the anti-Semitism spread 




Inspired by the surge of Nationalism and as a response to the increased anti-Semitism, 
Zionism developed during the 19
th
 century. Instead of being an unwanted and scattered global 
minority, the Jews were to seek their own state. Theodor Hertz is by many considered the 
founding father of Zionism after he published ―Der Judenstaat‖ in 1896 in which he gave a 
detailed outline of a Jewish state. The first Zionist congress was held a year later where the 
decision was made to work actively towards a Jewish home in Palestine. The worlds Zionist 
Organization had been established. In 1901 the first Jewish national Fund was established by 
the organization to finance land purchase for settlement and agriculture.
 
The founding of the 
world Zionist organization, marked a breach with traditional Jewish ―Messianism‖ which was 
based on the belief that the Messiah would at some point emerge and secure the Promised 
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Land for the Jewish people.
78
 Jews were encouraged by the organization to go to Palestine 
and start settlements. But as Golda Meir pointed out ―the idea of Jewish resettlement of 
Palestine had been urged by Jews and even some non-Jews long before the word ―pogrom‖ 
became part of the vocabulary of European Jewry‖.
79
 Labor Zionism and the Kibbutzim (a 
village based settlement approach that was based on hard work divided equally and by 
socialist ideals) inspired thousands in the early 1900`s, like Golda Meir who later was to 
become the Prime Minister of Israel. She left USA to go to live in a Kibbutz in Israel in 
1921.
80
 During WW1 Charles Weizmann, at the time a Jewish chemist with an astonishing 
diplomatic network was working in London while seeking British support for the Zionistic 
project. In return he argued that the British would get better relations to Russia and USA 
while weakening the Ottoman Empire. A Jewish Palestine would also secure British interest 
in the Middle East. November 2
nd
 1917 Weizmann had managed to get British foreign 
minister Arthur Balfour to declare British support for the creation of a Jewish national home 
in Palestine in the form of a letter to the leader of the British Zionist movement Lord 
Rothschild
81
; "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the 
achievement of the object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may 
prejudice the civil and religious' rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or 




5.2 British Rule 1918 – 1948 
The area of Palestine had been under the administration of the provinces of Damascus and 
Beirut, which belonged to Syria under the Ottoman Empire. It was called Palestine by the 
Arabic population that resided there, but had no clearly defined boarders. The promises made 
by the British in the Belfour declaration of a Jewish national home made the mandate of the 
Palestine area—which they received in the post WW1 negotiations—very difficult. Britain 
had military control of the area by 1918. Within two years deadly riots erupted; which the 
British saw in correlation with Palestinian disappointment of not obtaining independence, and 
Palestinian fear of the political and economic influence of the Jewish settlers. Much of 
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Palestinian land was owned by rich merchants living in Lebanon, Syria or other more central 
parts of the former empire. Palestinian farmers could not always compete with the Jewish 
settlers who purchased land privately or funded by the Jewish National fund.  Riots soon 
escalated to such a degree that Colonial minister Churchill published a white book in 1921 
attempting to explain British plans for the mandate. Unfortunately the white book was vague 
and stirred more unease. As the Jews demanded access to the Wailing Wall in 1929 clashes 
broke out again. When the Nazis took control in Germany in 1933 over 170.000 Jews 
immigrated to Palestine within three years. Again heavy confrontation broke out in 1936 as a 
consequence. The British assembled a commission (the Peel commission) to find solutions. In 
its 1937 rapport it concluded that the British mandate had to end. At the time Jewish settlers 
owned 5,6% of the Palestinian land through private ownership. The Peel commission 
recommended a division of the territory giving 33% to the Jews as a national home, while the 
rest of Palestine was to be absorbed into Transjordan. For the following two years, Palestine 
was the scene of guerrilla-like warfare. Not just between Arabs, Jews and the British, but also 
among different Palestinian-Arab fractions. A new commission (the Woodhead Commission) 
was set in 1938 which concluded that the Peel commission’s division-plan was not practical. 
Oil dependency meant that the British needed goodwill in the Arabic countries. A conference 
was held in London in 1939 which resulted in a white-paper that stated that the promises 
made to the Jews in the Belfour declaration had been kept, and Jewish immigration and land 
purchase was now to be limited. To the Jews this was a big betrayal and the Arabs rejected it 
as well, as it still allowed for immigration and some land-purchase. In October 1944 the 
Jewish union organization Haganah and different Jewish terrorist organizations joined forces 





The Jewish cause had a lot of sympathy in USA and in the world in general following WWII, 
and not without cause. ―By May 1945, the Germans and their collaborators had murdered six 
million European Jews as part of a systematic plan of genocide—the Holocaust.‖
84
 President 
Truman was pushed on the immigration issue by American Zionists who used it against him 
in the ongoing election governor and congress election. On Yom Kippur 1946 Truman 
decided to mobilize voters in the by announcing support for division in Palestine and the 
establishment of a Jewish state. Britain was weakened financially and militarily after WWII 
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and was facing liberation movements in many areas of imperial interest. September 1947 
Britain announced they would leave the Palestine question to the UN. United Nations Special 
Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was given the task to find a solution. UNSCOP 
concluded that the British mandate had to end and that the area was to be divided into a 
Jewish and a Palestinian state while Jerusalem and Bethlehem was to be administered by the 
UN. The Arab Palestinians refused this solution and got massive support from its Arabic 
neighbors and the Arabic League. Jewish settlers who now had private ownership of 8,6% of 
Palestine, was in the UNSCOP plans going to receive control of 56% of the territory. Not 
satisfied with the UNSCOP plans Israel still chose to accept. Truman gave the UNSCOP 
plans his support and it was acknowledged in the UN November 1947. The British decided to 
pull out completely from the area by May 15
th
 1948. Israel announced their Independence on 
the 14
th





5.3 War of Independence – al-Nakba (Arabic: The Catastrophe) 
1948-1949 
The day after Israel`s announcement the first Arab-Israeli war began. In the first phase of the 
war; Palestinians and their Arab allies consisting mainly of forces from of the Arabic 
liberation Army, Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon were successful though lacking 
coordination and proper training. Within four weeks the Arab coalition held most of what was 
to be the Palestinian state according to UN division plans. Egypt began focusing on securing 
their share of Palestinian land in competition with Transjordan. Transjordan also had a secret 
agreement with Israel that it would only hold the Palestinian areas of the partition plans, and 
not advance further. USA wanted UN to take responsibility in solving the conflict. UN Peace 
negotiators managed to get a four week truce which was mainly used by the participants to re-
arm. Israel was the most efficient at getting new arms and mobilizing more troops. UN had 
implemented a weapons embargo that struck the Arab nations the hardest. Unlike Israel who 
obtained their arms illegally from Czechoslovakia, USA and France, the Arabs went through 
the formal channels under the embargo. The UN suggestion of making Palestine a part of 
Transjordan was rejected by all parties. Another truce was achieved in July, but the UN 
negotiator Bernadotte was killed by Jewish terrorists. His new peace plan was also rejected by 
all sides including by votes within the UN. Israel then attacked in October. Egypt who was 
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now fighting alone as the Arabic alliance had unraveled, were defeated and chased into Egypt 
by Israeli forces by January 1949. Britain had a defense agreement with Egypt and demanded 
immediate retreat by Israel and was backed by USA in their demands. Israel aborted its raid 
and a new ceice-fire was in place on the 7
th
 the same month. During the peace talks Israel 
used its military superiority to continue to push the Arabic League and Jordan out of areas 
that Israel wanted to control. Israel created the facts on the ground and created the conditions 
for its negotiations with the Arab states. Armistice agreements were negotiated with one Arab 




 1949 on Rhodos. Israel expanded the territory it 





The goal of this chapter has been to provide background knowledge of events and conditions 
that has shaped and developed the state of Israel and its surroundings. The history of the area 
and the Jewish people as well as the international power struggle that led to Israel`s statehood, 
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6 Document Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains the relevant data derived from my chosen document selection, 
and is aimed at answering the research questions. The document material describes 
Israel’s interaction with the values, norms and practices of the society of states. 
 
This 20 year period will be divided into two 10 year periods; 1955-64 and 1965-1974. I 
have chosen to divide the material into two periods in order to have a more balanced 
analysis providing an even amount of data from each period. By this division I avoid 
focusing on particular events that could make the data biased. Hedley Bull’s theoretical 
concept of an international society, maintained decentralized by its member states 
providing order through the five institutions; Balance of Power, International Law, War 
Diplomacy and Great Powers, will be applied as theoretical indicators to reveal how 
Israel related to the framework of rules, norms and practices of the international 
society. I present the institutions drawing out their most relevant features for that 
purpose. Other than providing an impression of how Israel related to the institutions, 
special attention will be given to Israel’s interaction with Africa.  
 
The institutions of Balance of Power and Great Powers are closely intertwined as the 
maintenance of balance of power is a task of the great power management. I therefore 
choose to present their findings together. Great powers further exercise their 
management by enabling the institutions of International Law, War and Diplomacy. 
Acquired data on these three institutions will be presented following Balance of Power 
and Great Powers. I begin with a short specification the theoretical indicators, explaining 
what data I will be looking for in the document selection on each institution. 
 
Balance of Power: The data I select explain how Israel related to the local balance of 
power dynamics of the Middle East, which was subordinated the dominating balance of 
power between the great powers. In addition I seek sources revealing how Israel used 
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deterrence, particularly Israel`s effort to obtain a nuclear deterrent. The data must also 
provide insight on whether Israel can be said to be acting power maximizing or not.87 
 
Great Powers: Nuclear capability and military might was not evenly spread between 
the permanent members of UN Security Council throughout 1955-1974. USA had its first 
nuclear detonation in 1946, the Soviet Union in 1949 and Britain in 1952. France had 
their first test in 1960 and China in 1964. 88 Bull`s theory ideal requires a state to match 
the strength of the other great powers in order to achieve and sustain membership. In 
his study of world politics in 1977, Bull only identifies China, USA and the Soviet Union 
as great powers.89 The focus of this analysis will be on the USA and the Soviet Union as 
China had no real influence in the region. The former great powers Britain and France 
played a crucial role in the Middle East region up to and during our timeframe (1955-
1974) and will receive attention in that respect. Using the document selection I will 
present data to shed light on how Israel related to the great powers and their 
management of the region; in preserving the balance of power and their relationship 
with one another, and their efforts to limit and contain conflict and war. It must be 
determined what sphere of influence Israel may be said to belong to in the timeframe. 
By sphere of influence we are referring to Bull`s definition of the great power 
management in which a great power manage and stabilize geographical areas/regions 
under their control using their local preponderance.90 
 
International Law: Bull explained how International Law is a body of rules considered 
to have the status of law. In the modern state system these rules are to a large degree, 
formalized and facilitated through the United Nations (UN), an international 
organization working amongst other things for the maintenance of sovereignty, the 
keeping of agreements and the restriction of violence. Israel was accepted into the 
United Nations on the 11th of May 1949. “Noting furthermore the declaration by the State 
of Israel that it ‘unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and 
undertakes to honor them from the day when it becomes a Member of the United 
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Nations.”91 This of course includes; Article 2, stressing the principle of sovereign equality 
of all members, Article 33 demanding the exhaustion of all peaceful options to conflicts, 
and Article 39 to 42 referring to the role of the UN Security Council as determining the 
existence of threats and deciding what sanctions may be implemented.92 The documents 
must reveal if there are situations in which Israel can be said to disregard international 
law by not respecting bilateral or multilateral agreements, with states or with relevant 
organizations such as the UN. The data must also reflect Israel`s relationship with the 
principle of sovereignty and the principle of restriction of violence. Do the sources 
reveal if potential breaches are legitimized by Israel by overriding concerns such as self-
help or contested as facts altogether? Also, does Israel contribute to the mobilization for 
the enforcement or maintenance of international law?93 Who enforces and who breaks 
law will always be subject to interpretation. Continuous border confrontation and other 
conflicts fog the role or identity of both law-enforcer and law-breaker. It is complicated 
further when states provide non-state guerilla warfare combatants with support, 
training and arms. Providing proof of such support is often difficult and will be disputed.  
 
War: War can be a threat against the existence of international society. It can also be an 
instrument for the purposes of international society. The documents must reveal if wars 
Israel participate in is a threat or an instrument for the purposes of international 
society. The main focus will be on the material acts of war occurring between Israel and 
other sovereign states as war is only legitimately waged by sovereign states in the 
modern states system according to Bull. I hope to present sources that reveal the cause 
of war or at least Israel´s legitimization of it; be it balance of power considerations, law 
enforcement, or to achieve just change. It is also interesting to see if the data indicate 
how Israel meets the requirements of the restriction of war.94 
 
Diplomacy: Through this document analysis I hope to find sources providing insight on 
how Israel related to diplomacy. I will not focus on the specific methods for gathering 
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information or the Israeli ability to do so. Nor will I investigate the process of 
formulating the external policy. The documents will reflect how Israel worked the 
diplomatic arena in general. Did Israel see negotiation as a rational pursuit of interest 
where interest could be mutual, or only as an arena of self-interest? Are there examples 
of hostile diplomacy, or any data indicating that Israel abused its diplomatic privileges 
or otherwise interfered with the internal business of its host?95 Diplomacy facilitates 
communication and cooperation among states. It offers room for perception and 
deception and diplomatic action may be seeking to portray a different picture than 




6.2 Israel in the International Society 1955 – 1964 
 
 
6.2.1 Israel`s relations to the Institutions of Balance of Power and Great Powers 
 
The local balance of power situation of Israel in the Middle East 
The general balance of power situation between the Soviet Union and the USA, who 
were engaged in a global battle for friendship and allies, strongly determined the 
subordinated balance of power situation in the Middle East of 1955. Abba Eban Israel`s 
Ambassador to the USA (1950-59) wrote in his memoirs; “The United States was trying 
to build a ring of bases around the Soviet Union, in the course of which it would make “so-
called defense treaties” with Middle Eastern states. The Central imperative of Soviet 
security was to frustrate this design.”96 Both sides wanted Egypt on their side of the 
balance, preferably through a defense treaty.  Egypt had since 1948 implemented a 
general blockade of Israel by stopping its ships, and searching all other ships passing 
through the Suez Canal97 for contraband, meaning any supplies to Israel. Gamal Nasser 
the informal leader of Egypt since a coup in 1952 became president by 1956. Egypt had 
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refused Israeli ships to sail through the Strait of Tiran98 since the War of Independence 
and until 1957, when UN forces took charge of the area enabling Israeli passage. 
Following a series of minor clashes on the Gaza border, Israel raided Gaza on the 28th of 
February 1955 in the bloodiest confrontation since the Independence War. According to 
Waage; that event in particular made Nasser more concerned with security issues, 
making him turn to the Soviet Union for arms.99 Eban described the event. On the 27th of 
September 1955 Egypt announced the arms deal; “A turning point came when the Soviet 
Union authorized a massive arms transaction with Egypt through Czechoslovakia. 
Weapons of a destructive capacity hitherto unknown in the Middle East poured into Egypt 
at a rate beyond all previous experience. (…)The Balance of power in the Middle East 
would now be a function of East-West relations.”100 The Soviet Union did not see Israel as 
a likely allied, hence a friendship with Egypt was much more valuable, as the Israeli state 
archives reveals; “Since the mid 1950`s, the Soviet union regarded Israel as totally 
committed to the Western Bloc. The fact that Israel was not officially affiliated to any 
Western pact or organization was of no significance to the Russians or their allies.”101  
 
Israel was not confident in its security situation. On all borders were enemies from the 
Independence War; Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and also Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen who sent combatants.102 The USA was reluctant to balance out the Soviet-
Egyptian relations with arms-supplies and support, as to damage their relations to Egypt 
and the Arab nations. But the USA who would not arm Israel itself had no objection that 
its allies did, and Israel was able to secure arms from France who also saw Nasser as an 
enemy. According to Waage, Egypt provided aid and training to Front de Libération 
Nationale (FNL), the Algerian liberation organization that was fighting the colonial 
power of France in the Algerian war (1954-1962).103 Israel received 12 Mirage fighter-
planes in April 1956. In June they signed a massive arms deal in for another 72 fighter 
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jets, 200 tanks and large amounts of ammunition that was delivered a month later.104 
The same month, Britain pulled out from Suez as it had promised to Egypt 20 months 
earlier. This meant the removal of an important buffer for Israel.  
 
Nasser was angry after the USA and Britain who had agreed to finance the Aswan 
project in December 1955, withdrew their support six months later as a reply to Egypt’s 
recognition of the Communist regime in Beijing in March 1956. The Aswan dam was a 
massive irrigation project that would improve Egyptian agriculture and industry. 
Shimon Peres, an Israeli defense official at the time, claim it was Egypt’s parallel 
negotiation with the Soviet Union for funding that made the Americans change their 
decision. Nasser replied by nationalizing the Suez Canal the 26th of July. With the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal, the blockade of the Tiran Strait, Egypt’s military 
coordination efforts with Syria, and the guerilla attacks from Sinai and Egypt controlled 
Gaza; Israel interpreted it as Nasser’s intent to attack, according to Golda Meir.105 
In September 1956 France invited Israel in on their plans to invade Egypt to regain 
control of the canal in what was later known as the Suez Campaign or Suez War. France 
and Britain had strongly disliked Nasser`s pan-Arabic efforts in the region as well as the 
nationalization of the canal. The British also blamed Nasser for their loss of influence in 
Jordan. The plan was that Israel would invade Sinai in order to stop Fedayeen attacks. 
France and Britain was then to intervene in the conflict, take control of the Suez Canal 
and provide a responsible management of the canal.  
 
The attack was launched 29th of October and proved quite successful until USA applied 
pressure to stop Britain, France and Israel. The Soviet Union suggested in November to 
USA that they should undertake a joint action in order to stop the war, but USA declined. 
The Soviet Union applied pressure towards France and Britain by indirectly threatening 
to apply nuclear weapons to stop the war. This led the USA to announce that it would 
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protect its allies against attacks. The USA applied pressure on the aggressors by 
stopping the shipping of oil to Europe. Britain was soon unable to stabilize the Pound 
and the USA also stopped Britain`s money reserves from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to apply additional pressure. France and Britain was forced to end the 
campaign, but Israel was not willing to withdraw from Sinai and Gaza which it had 
managed to occupy. Only after the USA threatened to stop all aid to Israel as well as seize 
to protect Israel from UN sanctions, did Israel retreat to the armistice borders of 1949. 
Meir claims that for Israel, threats of direct Soviet Union intervention were the source of 
greatest pressure for an Israeli withdrawal. By January 1957 the war was ended, 
cementing the Soviet Union`s view of Israel as a western allied.106  Egypt had lost the 
pre-war arms advantage, at least temporarily. Michael Brecher, currently Political 
Science Professor at Yale, points out in his analysis of Israel`s foreign policy system of 
1948-68; “The Sinai Campaign of 1956 restored the balance.”107 According to Brecher; 
other than destroying the Egyptian military capability and gaining confidence, Israel 
obtained large amounts of abandoned Soviet Union arms, and gained access to the Red 
Sea through the strait of Tiran once again.108 ”The Egyptian Army was mauled in the Suez-
Sinai War its Air Force decimated. Vast quantities of equipment fell into Israeli hands. 
Within two years, however, the balance of military capability was restored, largely through 
Soviet bloc aid.”109  
 
Israel had not increased its popularity among the Arabs after the Sinai War and now 
looked for friendships elsewhere to improve its strategic situation. In Europe, Israel 
went as far as reaching out to West Germany to but arms in December 1957.110 But it 
was not only in Europe new friendships were sought. Israel wanted to befriend the 
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“periphery” surrounding the Arab states. Historian Polakow-Suransky wrote; “The 
Brainchild of Mossad leaders Reuven Shiloah and Isser Harel, the periphery strategy was a 
crucial part of Israel`s plan to check the expansion of Nasser`s pan-Arabism as well as 
Soviet influence in the period.”111 The new and developing post-colonial states were 
perfect candidates. Israel State Archives states the policy at the time; “Israel wished to 
prevent the new states in Africa from forging strong ties with the Arab states, by exploiting 
the fear most of them had of Egypt. The economic ties Israel had with the developing 
nations played an important role in this”.112 Golda Meir, Israel`s Foreign Minister at the 
time began Israel’s “International Cooperation Program”—later named the MASHAV 
collaboration program in 1958, which focused on collaboration and development of 
post-colonial African countries.113  However as the Israeli State Archives mentions; 
“Israel’s fervent desire to strengthen its ties with the newly independent nations of Africa, 
and those on the verge of becoming independent, did not prevent it from continuing its ties 
with their greatest adversary—South Africa. The reason for this was twofold: the presence 
of an important Jewish community there and the fear that if these relations cooled there 
was a possibility that South Africa would be drawn closer to Egypt (…).”114 
 
The Israeli state archives describe 1958-1959 as dominated by “(…) efforts to obtain 
security guarantees from the western powers and to find increased sources for the 
purchase of arms. Furthermore, attempts were made, which were not successful, to find 
ways to affiliate with NATO.”115 The goal was to even the balance of Nasser’s increased 
military power of Soviet Union weapons that Egypt had received after the Suez War. 
Egypt and Syria also formed a political union in 1958 called the “United Arab Republic” 
(UAR), but it was dissolved only three years later.116 According to Brecher, Israel 
obtained an important arms-agreement from West Germany in 1960 but France was 
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unquestionably the most important arms source.117 “During the years prior to the Sinai 
Campaign, and even after it, France was the main source of supply of arms to Israel, 
especially fighter planes and tanks.” 118 With the independence of Algeria in 1962 the 
relations between France and the Arab world improved. Yitzhak Rabin, the IDF chief of 
Operation Branch stressed the need for breaking the American arms blockade in the 
early 60`s as the Arab`s seemed to strengthen their position.119 1964 saw a series of 
Arab summits in the attempt to create greater Arab unity. In this process the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) were founded to 
fight the Palestinian cause. Other than this, the “new” Arab unity proved to be short 
lived. Egypt was tied up spending heavy resources in the Yemen civil war (1962 – 1967) 
where it had committed 1/3 of its army.120 
 
Nuclear Deterrence 
September 1956 had also marked the beginning of French assistance for the Israeli 
nuclear program as France entered a verbal agreement to sell Israel a nuclear reactor as 
a reward for creating the pretext for the Suez War. France also depended on Israeli help 
and intelligence in the Algerian War (1954-1962). The reactor-deal with France was 
formalized after the Suez war in 1957. Peres claim Israeli prime Minister, Ben-Gurion 
saw nuclear power as a necessity for a nation blessed with few resources, situated in a 
difficult security situation. A deal was signed a year later, that France would deliver 
enriched plutonium and, a 24 megawatt reactor. Construction began in Dimona in 1960 
under the cover of making a textile factory. The USA soon became aware of the plans, 
but Israel convinced them it was for peaceful purposes. In 1962 Kennedy agreed to sell 
Israel a Hawk antiaircraft missile system to protect the Dimona nuclear reactor. The 
reactor was completed by 1963.121 By 1964 Israel was also improving its conventional 
military and looked to strengthen it further. As Eban noted; “Although relations with 
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France still seemed cordial and the supply belt was moving smoothly, we had reached the 
stage where we could not maintain a balance of power without an American component in 
armour and aircraft.”122 
 
Power maximizing 
I argue that on the basis of the data presented above that Israel was acting power 
maximizing in the local balance, resisting the restraints of the general balance to 
improve its security situation. Israel’s main priority was to avoid being destroyed or 
absorbed by other states which in Bull`s theory can occur if the general balance calls for 
it.123 While unsuccessfully trying to achieve formal security guarantees to prevent its 
destruction, Israel power maximizing to such a degree that it acquired the technology 
and assistance to initiate its own nuclear program. However, Israel was adherent to the 
demands of the dominant balance as it depended on the good will of the great powers, 
particularly the USA.  
 
The Middle East as a sphere of influence 
The Middle East was the field of an ongoing battle for influence. Spheres of influence 
were not fully established; in fact the region was under radical change. Britain and 
France were no longer the dominating great powers globally that they once were. Now 
they worked to a certain degree together with the USA to prevent the influence of the 
Soviet Union in the Middle East. At the division of the Ottoman Empire in the Versailles 
negotiations in 1919, Britain had received the mandate for Iraq and Palestine (Israel, 
Palestine, Jordan), while France had the mandate for Syria and Lebanon. After World 
War II both Britain and France were forced to withdraw from their colonies and other 
areas of influence, leaving open a power vacuum for the two new global powers, the USA 
and the Soviet Union to compete for. As for the sphere surrounding Israel, the USA 
sought to befriend most of these states but was faced with pan-Arabic sentiments and 
the anti-west, anti-colonist movement in the region. In addition Israel mobilized the 
Jewish-American population against the development US-Arab relations, swaying 
election results and pressuring American decision makers.124 In 1955 Britain, Iraq, 
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Turkey and also Iran and Pakistan came together to form a defense alliance known as 
the Baghdad pact. The USA had signed a defense agreement with Iraq the year before, 
but remained at least formally an observer to the pact. After the Iraqi military coup in 
1958, Iraq left the Baghdad pact seeking a closer collaboration with Egypt and the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet Union exploited the post-colonial resentment of the West and gained 
friendships by providing arms to Egypt and later Syria. USA replied by formalizing its 
new Middle East policy in 1957 as a part of its global efforts against Communism. It was 
known as the Eisenhower doctrine. History professor Peter L. Hahn describes its 
purpose; “The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 declared that the United States would 
distribute economic and military aid and, if necessary, use military force to stop the spread 
of communism in the Middle East.”125 As Egypt got its arms in 1955 and later nationalized 
Suez, the USA slowly gave up befriending Egypt. 126 In Syria pan-Arabism was more 
deep-rooted than in Egypt. After French rule until 1946 Syria underwent five years of 
dictatorship before a democratic election gave the Baath party the control in 1954. Syria 
feared Israeli expansionism and Western colonialism more than Communism.  In spite of 
the failed United Arabic Union of 1958-1961 Syria`s close ties to Egypt and Soviet 
continued.  
 
Lebanon, also a part of the former French mandate, was considered by the West to be 
more progressed and Western than Syria. President Chamoun (1952-58) kept good 
relations to the West, and received both aid and weapons from USA in 1953. Lebanon 
did not wish to join either side in a defense pact, but signed a trade-agreement with USA 
in 1955. During the Suez War, Lebanon maintained diplomatic relations to the West 
which aggravated its Arab neighbors. Facing increased internal dismay with its Western 
ties, Chamoun used the Eisenhower doctrine to get American support to stop the 
internal revolt in 1958. A new president was instated as a result, but Lebanon remained 
friendly to the West, though internally tense throughout this first period of 1955-
1964.127 
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Jordan had enjoyed close ties to Britain since its establishment and competed with Egypt 
for leading role amongst the Arabs. By 1956 Jordan’s relationship to Britain would 
change following demonstrations by the large numbers of Palestinian refugees that was 
now part of Jordan. On the 1st of March 1956 the British were thrown out of Jordan. Free 
elections were held for the first time, and it was decided that the economic and military 
collaboration with Britain was to end. Instead, Jordan would seek closer ties with Syria 
and Egypt. Jordan’s King called upon the USA to enforce the Eisenhower doctrine, 
claiming a military coup was about to unfold in order to get rid of the prime minster and 
the parliament. As a result Jordan became a police state with a pro-American 
government.  
 
Together with Turkey who had been a NATO member since 1951, Israel, Jordan, Iran 
and to some degree Lebanon belonged to the American sphere of influence during this 
first period. The Soviet Union sphere of influence in the region consisted of Egypt, Syria 
and after 1958 also Iraq.128 
 
Israel’s relation to the Great Power management 
According to Waage Israel declined an American offer in February 1955 for a mutual 
defense treaty, which would provide that much sought after Great Power guarantee for 
Israel`s safety. She claims it was the American demand for Israel to stop its retaliation 
strategy and cease to use force to change its borders that made the tempting suggestion 
unacceptable. By ending the Suez War America demonstrated its ability to restrain the 
former great powers of the region, France and Britain. The USA also demonstrated the 
willingness to restrain the regional power of Israel from completing its objectives, and 
hence maintaining regional stability, and acting out its local preponderance. The 
relationship between Israel and USA was much improved already by 1957 following the 
Suez war. In 1958 following the military coup in Baghdad 14th of July, the USA turned to 
Israel for help in order to stabilize Jordan and Lebanon. According to Israeli State 
Archives, Israel had become an important and stable regional support for the West.129 
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Britain and the USA asked permission to use Israel`s airspace in the operation to 
stabilize Jordan and Lebanon in the unrest following Iraq’s coup. The USA was granted 
permission without too much deliberation, while Britain did not enjoy the same 
treatment. The Israeli State Archives describes the situation; “Reactions of the opposition 
both in Britain and in Israel had to be considered as well as fears that the countries of 
Africa and Asia would brand Israel as a collaborator with imperialism; and above all 
apprehension of the reaction from the Soviet Union, whose threats against Israel during 
the Sinai Campaign had not been forgotten.”130 Israel asked for American permission to 
grant the British use of Israeli airspace symbolizing the American predominance. Israel 
also used the situation to bargain with Britain that Britain would no longer intervene in 
Israeli-Jordanian border clashes. Britain agreed and received permission to use Israel’s 
airspace. From the Soviet Union, Israel received the following response according the 
Israeli State Archives; “(...)by putting its airspace at the disposal of Britain and the United 
States it bears responsibility for the increase in tension in the Middle East, which could 
develop into a conflict of most serious consequences to the national interests of Israel.”131 It 
was in light of this threat that Israel`s ambassador to Washington Abba Eban, received 
from the American Secretary of State, Dulles, reassurance that USA would intervene if 
Israel was attacked by the Soviet Union. ”He added that the Soviet Union is well aware of 
this and therefore the fears of a Soviet attack are groundless.”132 
 
The USA supported the freedom of navigation principle in regards to the Suez channel, 
but also approved the Arab boycott towards Israel in terms of the sovereign right of 
each nation to contain the commerce within its borders. In the border-conflicts in 
1958/59 with Syria, Israel did not receive the support it expected by the USA in the 
Security Council. Also the USA did not recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and 
kept its embassy in Tel Aviv encouraging other states to do the same, according to the 
Israeli State Archives.133 “Since the United States determined its attitude while taking into 
consideration its relations with the Arab states, Israel did not always gain satisfaction 
                                                        
130
 Israel State Archives: Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel, 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13, ed 
Baruch Gilead (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p. xii-xiii. 
131
 Israel State Archives: Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel, 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13, ed 
Baruch Gilead (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p. 31. 
132
 Israel State Archives: Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel, 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13, ed 
Baruch Gilead (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p 35. 
133
 Israel State Archives: Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel, 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13, ed 
Baruch Gilead (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p. xxvii-xxix. 
51 
 
from Washington.”134 Nevertheless, Israel`s relationship with the USA only improved 
between 1960-1964. In spite of hiding its Dimona activities from America, Israel 
received missiles and other technology to protect the Dimona facility.  
Since the mid 1950`s Israel’s relations to the Soviet Union had been at a standstill. Ben-
Gurion had suggested to the Soviet Ambassador in Tel Aviv in 1958 a change of 
relations, including the possibility of a Soviet Union arms supply to Israel and an active 
role as an intermediary between Israel and the Arab states. There was no response to 
the suggestion, and when Israel allowed the USA and Britain use its airspace Soviet`s 
response was threatening. The Soviet Union also made statements in their official 
documents of support for the legal rights of the Palestinian Arabs whom had been 
“expelled from their homeland”. Israel feared at the time that the Soviet Union plotted 
with Nasser to reduce Israel’s territory to the 1947 borders.135 
 
 
6.2.2 Israel`s relation to the institutions of International Law, War and Diplomacy 
 
Israel`s relation to the principle of Sovereignty  
Abiding to the principle of state sovereignty is fundamental as a weakening of its stature 
may threaten the entire society of states. Israel protected its people, territory and 
ultimately its constitutional independence from its surrounding states. When attacked 
by guerilla groups, Israel held any host state or states supporting that group directly 
responsible. Israel`s raids into Egypt controlled Gaza in 1955 was by Israel legitimized 
as self-help against attacks from both the Egyptian Army and guerilla groups operating 
from Egyptian territory. An Israeli raid into Syria in 1955 known as the Kinneret 
operation was also legitimized by Israel as self-help to protect Israeli sovereignty. 
Waage questions the legitimacy of the self-help claim, arguing the size and efficiency of 
the operation revealed it as a planned and conscious effort by Israel to provoke an 
Egyptian-Syrian attack. According to Waage, an Arab attack could legitimize a war with 
Egypt before it became too powerful. This tactic was aimed at avoiding the label of 
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aggressor if war was initiated.136 In the planning phase with France and Britain before 
the Suez War, Israel stuck to this tactic. It was important to legitimize the Israeli attack 
as a reaction to the recent Guerilla attacks from Gaza and Sinai as not to be violating the 
territorial sovereignty of Egypt, but as advancing to protect the sovereignty of its own 
territory and people through self-help.137 According to Israeli author and journalist 
Michael Karpin, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion made himself clear on the matter. “Israel will 
not start the war, and will not play the aggressor, while England and France appears as 
the angels of peace.”138 Israel also pointed to the Egyptian blockade of Suez, the Strait of 
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as inhibiting on Israeli trade and security interests. Free 
access through the latter two was by Israel considered as something close to an 
extension of its territorial rights.  
 
Therefore, following the Suez War Israel`s access to the Gulf and the Strait received 
much attention and debate. According to Ann Ellen Danseyar`s paper; Legal Status of the 
Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran: “Subsequent to the Commission's work, the 
Secretary-General of the U.N. General Assembly, in 1957, recognized what were and 
continued to be the claims of various world powers: that the Gulf of Aqaba was an 
international waterway, through which innocent passage could not be suspended.” 139 At 
the 1958 Geneva Law of the Sea Conference, most nations also considered the Strait of 
Tiran to be an international waterway, open to all ships.140 Israel signaled very clearly 
that a further prevention of Israel`s access to the Strait was to be seen as an act of 
war.141 One consequence of the Suez War was that the international society sought to 
establish law that could help to avoid a repetition of events. The areas legal status was to 
be considered international waterways and in this respect the Suez war, regardless of 
other intent, turned out to have law changing or law-establishing consequences, at least 
in this location. 
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Israel called upon its sovereign rights for more than legitimizing military self-help. It 
called upon its to avoid the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in 
1961 in spite of signing a treaty that allowed it. 142 Yet it was another case in this period 
that really called to the attention the role of sovereignty. On the 11th of May 1960, Adolf 
Eichmann, known as one of the most significant architects behind the Jewish Holocaust 
was captured in Argentine. The news was announced by Israel on May 23rd along with 
expressions of regrets over any violation of Argentinian law. Stressing Eichmann’s 
unique position, Israel hoped Argentine would overlook the violation. Argentine 
demanded Eichmann would be returned along with those who had taken him, and 
argued that the violation of their sovereign rights was a threat to the principle rights of 
international coexistence. According to Argentine, The Eichmann incident should be 
used to create precedence for similar matters allowing no exception to the principle of 
sovereignty. Foreign Minister Meir argued that this was an isolated violation of 
Argentine law which had to be seen in the light of Eichmann’s position. Lippman argues 
that Israel claimed the abduction had been done by private individuals not Israel, hence 
Israel had no responsibility and the UN Security Council had no jurisdiction. Israel 
apologized again and after the two governments exchanged their ambassadors with new 
ones, a joint communique was issued stating that the issue of Israeli national’s violation 
of Argentinian fundamental rights was closed. 143 
 
Israel`s relation to the principle of Respecting Agreements  
The respect of agreements, is a basic rule of coexistence that all members of 
international society should respect and benefit from. Israel had as any member of the 
United Nations promised to follow the UN Charter. Israel claimed that it acted in 
accordance to UN Charter Article 33, when it filed complaints the Armistice Control 
Commission about Egypts violation of the armistice agreement. But Israel did not 
receive a Security Council legitimization to initiate the Suez War, and hence was in 
breech with article 39.144 The Suez War was legitimized in public by the overriding 
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concern of state survival, regardless of this claim was real, just perceived to be so, or if it 
was a planned deception to create the condition for the French and British 
intervention.145 This was not the first time Israel circumvented international 
agreements. According to Waage, Israel had used illegal channels for the acquisition of 
arms since the War of Independence.146  Israeli Journalist Michael Karpin described the 
situation; “Israel`s greatest difficulty was the embargo on the sale of arms to the Middle 
East instituted by the United states, Britain and France in 1952.”147  According to 
Polakow-Suransky, Shimon Peres the Director General of the Defense Ministry saw it as 
his task to break the embargo that was suffocating Israel. “In this spirit, Peres created a 
parallel Foreign Ministry behind the back of Foreign Minister Golda Meir.”148 Together 
with France, Israel broke the embargo in 1956. Peres claims the French insisted that 
both Israeli and French Foreign Ministry was kept in the dark. It was kept between the 
Defense Ministries.149 
 
US president Eisenhower assumed nuclear capability would spread beyond the USA and 
the Soviet Union and chose a diplomatic strategy to deal with this challenge. In his 
“Atoms for Peace Speech” in 1953 he called for a peaceful international nuclear research 
collaboration, which led to the creation of the IAEA in 1957 and the “Atoms for Peace 
Program” where selected governments received research reactors if agreeing to certain 
conditions of peaceful use. This was done to absorb new sovereign states in their 
American sphere of influence and was also used for bargaining, obtaining resources and 
bases in areas of strategic interest. America signed an agreement in 1955 to give Israel a 
5000 kilowatt research reactor, but as a restriction Israel was not permitted to produce 
plutonium. It is possible that the USA did not believe Israel had the know-how to do so. 
The nuclear program Israel had with France was in violation with this agreement.150 As 
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a member of IAEA since 1957 Israel agreed; “To establish and administer safeguards 
designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, 
facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its 
supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to 
apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral 
arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of 
atomic energy;”151 Israel purchased 10 tons of enriched uranium from South Africa 
which was reported to IAEA in 1962/1963. But as mentioned, Israel refused IAEA 
inspections since 1961, a responsibility that was outsourced to American inspectors 
after much negotiation.152 
 
The UN Security Council resolution 181 of August 1963 contained a volunteer 
(mandatory by 1977) weapons embargo against the apartheid regime of South Africa. 
“Solemnly calls upon all states to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, 
ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa;” 153 According to Polakow-
Suransky, Israel supported the volunteer embargo. “In 1963, Meir told the U.N. General 
Assembly that Israelis could not condone apartheid due to Jews historical experience as 
victims of oppression and went on to pledge that Israel “had taken all necessary steps” to 
prevent Israeli arms from reaching South Africa, directly or indirectly.”154 
Between 1955 and 1964 the documents reveal that Israel had a selective relationship to 
the keeping of agreements and the principle of sovereignty, though abiding to them 
more often than not. Israel clearly saw the value of being or seeming law abiding, hiding 
their law-breaking behavior when possible, and explaining them if exposed as 
exceptions based on overriding principles of state survival. The Eichmann case is hard to 
legitimize as relating to state survival, representing maybe the most obvious breach of 
sovereignty in the period. Its obligations to international law were seen as secondary to 
their security concerns and balancing efforts towards Egypt. At the same time Israel 
depended on a functioning international law for those same concerns. 
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Israel`s relation to the principle of restricting violence 
In 1952 Israel adopted a new military strategy to deal with border conflicts with its 
surrounding neighbor’s. The Arab “needle prick” strategy designed to exhaust and 
demotivate the Israeli`s was to be met with massive retaliation each time. The massive 
violence was applied with the intent to restrict violence in the long run through 
deterrence by eliminating enemies and causing deterrence against future attacks.155 
This preemptive strategy was an attempt at expanding the notion of defense or self-help. 
As we cannot assume Egypt would have attacked Israel it is hard to know if the Suez war 
restricted violence in the sense of being preemptive. Golda Meir would later argue that 
the American intervention made that mission incomplete.156 Israel`s ambiguity about its 
the nuclear program was also intended to be deter attacks. Israel`s dealings with the 
Syrians on the 1964 National Water Carrier program showed a continuation of the 
massive retaliation tactics. 
 
Israel`s relation to the Institution of War 
 
Material war 
Material war means actual combat and may include any form of military clashes among 
sovereign states. If we take this to include border conflicts, Israel engaged in material 
war often throughout this period. What will not be sufficiently reflected here are the 
guerilla attacks that led to many of Israel`s operations. If any guerilla group launched an 
operation in or into Israeli territory, Israel held the neighboring state from which the 
group operated, directly accountable. According to Abba Eban; Moshe Sharett, Israel`s 
Prime Minister at the time authorized a raid on Gaza in February 1955, following six 
months of forty armed clashes and twenty-seven raids on Israeli territory. To Israel and 
Eban, Egypt and Nasser were responsible. “There had been no incursions by Israel into 
Egyptian territory, and Egypt had been condemned by the Armistice Commission twenty six 
times.”157 The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was responsible 
for overseeing the Armistice agreements and receiving complaints and reports of 
hostilities. UNTSO sent their recommendations for further action to the UN Security 
Council. Frustrated by facing veto`s against any sanctions or intervention towards Egypt 
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in the Security Council, and what Israel saw as an overall ineffective Armistice 
Commission, the Israeli forces raided Gaza on the 28th of February leading to 37 
Egyptian deaths. From Israel’s point of view, peaceful negotiations was attempted and 
proved unfruitful due to the inefficiency of the Armistice Commission and the veto 
situation in the UN Security Council. Hence, negotiation led to no real change in the 
situation.158 
 
In the end of August Israel led a new attack into Gaza on Khan Yonis, killing another 37 
Egyptians, and in November, Israel took control of the demilitarized El Auja zone killing 
81 Egyptians on the Egyptian side of the zone.159 In December, Syria fired on Israeli 
fishing vessels on Lake Tiberius according to Eban. This violation of sovereignty led 
Israeli forces to enter Syria the following night killing seventy-three Syrians, and losing 
six of their own. This was later known as the Kinneret operation and ruined the ongoing 
efforts to obtain US arms.160 According to Ambassador Eban; “There was a clash between 
two military needs—the need for retaliation and the long-term need for defensive 
arms.”161 Hilde Waage claims that the fishing-vessel was a police-boat and the 
provocation towards Syria was a planned effort by Israel to create legitimacy for 
crossing the Syrian border in hopes of stirring a confrontation with Egypt and Syria 
before they became too powerful with Soviet Union arms.162 Throughout 1956 there 
was shelling to the north between Israel and Syria. Shooting also occurred frequently 
between Israel and Jordan. The Jordanians made raids into Israel that was retaliated by 
Israel on the 10th of October, resulting in more deaths. According to Waage these conflict 
were part of a smokescreen to blur the upcoming Sinai-campaign. By drawing attention 
to the Jordanian conflict, the world was less prepared for an Israeli attack on Egypt.163 
 
Foreign Minister at the time Golda Meir, later wrote in her memoirs; “Israel`s own strike 
against the Egyptians in 1956 had one goal and one goal only—to prevent the destruction 
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of the Jewish state.”164 However the Suez War was also a preemptive war by Israel who 
saw this as an opportunity to deal with Egypt at a strategically important time. The 
nationalization of the Suez Canal provided Israel with British and French support. Other 
than dealing with the guerilla activists on Sinai and in Gaza, Israel wanted to weaken the 
Egyptian military capability and obtain access for its ships through the Suez. Egypt had 
prevented Israeli access since 1948, based on the argument that there was still a state of 
war between them.165 Israel would also receive arms and nuclear help from France as a 
reward.166 Golda Meir explained her understanding of the reasons for the war; “But we 
hadn`t fought the Sinai Campaign for territory, booty or prisoners, and as far we were 
concerned, we had won the only thing we wanted: peace, or at least the promise of peace 
for a few years. (..) This time we would insist that our neighbors come to terms with us—
and with our existence.”167 The war begun October 29th and was over with the Israeli 
announcement of retreat from Gaza and Sinai 1st of March 1957.  
In 1964 conflicts arose during the National Water Carrier project towards Syria. Yitzhak 
Rabin was Chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces; “In the course of 1964, the Syrians 
kept the border in turmoil by employing artillery and armor.”168 Syria began work to 
divert the water before it reached Israel. Shelling from Syria’s Golan Heights increased 
mid-November and Israel responded with air-strikes. To stop the Syrians from diverting 
water, Rabin trained tank-crews to operate long range to take out their earthmoving 
vehicles. As Israel was able to strike the Syrian machines at two and a half miles range, it 
meant the end of Syria`s sabotage endeavors by 1965.169 
 
Disposition to war 
Israel had been to war with all its neighboring states. Perceived or real, Israel saw itself 
in immediate danger throughout this period. The Holocaust of World War II, the War of 
Independence in 1948, the Suez War and all the border confrontations occurring at the 
time suggest that Israel was in a constant disposition to war if not directly engaged in 
war. It is my opinion that although Israel may have perceived itself to be waging just war 
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as an instrument for the maintenance of the society of states, Israel was in fact posing a 
threat to it. 
 
Israel`s relation to the Institution of Diplomacy  
Israel`s strategy since the War of independence had been to achieve armistice 
agreements with its Arab-enemies once its objectives was reached militarily, but also to 
avoid peace agreements that meant bowing to Arab demands through compromise.170 
Israel spent more diplomatic resources on influencing the great powers, the UN, and the 
world opinion to obtain arms, support and resources than time seeking peace with its 
neighbors. Abba Eban was sent to Washington in the end of 1950 to function as 
ambassador to both Washington and the UN.171  “I made a definition of my aims: In 
Washington to strive for a viable, if not an affectionate relationship with the Eisenhower 
administration; at the United Nations to use the international platform to give some 
special resonance to Israel`s cause;”172 To Eban the most important thing was to establish 
good relations with Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.  
 
In 1955 Eban met with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, in 
San Francisco in relation to the 10th anniversary of the UN. Molotov explained the sales 
of arms to Egypt; “The Soviet Union was supplying military and other aid to Egypt not for 
the purpose that Egypt should make war against Israel. It followed therefore that the arms 
would not be used for that purpose. “173 Israel did in the end launch what they called a 
preemptive attack, legitimizing Egypt’s use of Soviet arms, but more relevant in this 
context is the fact that there was diplomatic communication on this level and on these 
subjects. Professor Michael Brecher noted that; “More inept was the rejection of an 
approach from Peking early in 1955 to establish formal ties.174 China later developed a 
pro-Arab policy but it’s difficult to know if it could have been otherwise. Rejecting China 
was partially a result of fear for undermining American security guarantee. 
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To level the balance of the Middle East, Israel had to rely on diplomatic ties to France. 
Shimon Peres, an official agent of the Defense Ministry at the time claim that France 
insisted that the Foreign Ministries of both governments was kept out of the arms 
deals.175 “The French diplomats thought that Egypt could be appeased and were afraid of a 
rift between themselves and their American and British allies, hence their reservations 
about drawing too close to Israel.”176 But as Ben-Gurion made clear in Knesset October 
15 1956, Israel was, thanks to France much better equipped than a few months ago. 
Israel`s ambassador to France, Jacob Tsur, was not informed of the full extent of the 
collaborations between the Defense Ministries but understood his role and continued 
lobbying for arms as if Israel received none.177  
 
The Eisenhower administration sent Robert Anderson on a mission to the Middle East 
trying to negotiate a peaceful solution between Nasser and Ben-Gurion before the war. 
Abbas Eban noted; “Ben-Gurion had succeeded in conveying a strong an sincere 
impression of Israel`s desire for peace,(...) It’s possible that Nasser’s lack of cooperation 
with the Anderson mission played a part in the dramatic change of heart by the United 
States on the issue of the Aswan high dam. (...) On direct instructions from Jerusalem we 
joined in helping to frustrate Egypt`s ambition for American aid in the Aswan Dam 
project.”178As the war drew closer Eban received new instructions in Washington. 
“Indeed, I was puzzled by directives from Jerusalem in late October urging me to sharpen 
the conflict with Jordan and, indirectly, with Britain about the position on our eastern 
frontier.”179 As Israel mobilized on the 29th of October Eban received orders to “describe 
the situation as arising from “security measures” and to stress that there was no 
connection between what we were doing and the conflict of other powers.”180 When the 
war broke out, Eban spoke to the Security Council; “I stated categorically that we did not 
intend to acquire new territories, but merely to eliminate threats to our security arising 
from the murder gangs and hostile armies.”181 
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Diplomatic relations in Africa 
Professor Brecher pointed out Israel`s anti-apartheid policy; “Since 1955 Israel had 
supported UN General Assembly resolutions “deploring” or “condemning” South Africa`s 
policy of Apartheid.“182 Golda Meir, Israel’s Foreign Minister since 1956 turned her 
attention to making new friendships after Israel retreated from Sinai. “We couldn`t offer 
Africa money or arms, but on the other hand, we were free of the taint of the colonial 
exploiters because all that we wanted from Africa was friendship.”183 As Ghana got its 
independence in 1957 Ehud Avriel, Israel’s ambassador to Libya, suggested Meir 
participate at the first anniversary of Ghana`s independence in 1958. That was the start 
of Meir`s initiative to visit several African countries. By 1963 she had visited 12 African 
independent states or independence seeking nations. Ghana was hosting the first All-
African People`s Conference during Meir`s 1958 visit, and Meir was introduced to the 
African leaders before the conference. The Algerian representative questioned how 
Israel could justify their relationship with France, to which Meir replied; “Our neighbors 
(...) are out to destroy us with arms that they receive free of charge from the Soviet Union 
and for very little money from other sources. (...) If De Gaulle was the Devil himself, I would 
regard it as the duty of my government to buy arms from the only source available to us. 
(...) If you were in that position what would you do?”184 The representatives seemed to 
appreciate the honesty. Over the next years Israel created projects and education in 
Africa on irrigation, health, agriculture and security, using Israeli experts participating 
hands-on on projects. Courses on these subjects were also held in Israel where they 
received Africans for training. Historian Sasha Polakow-Suransky points out; “Israel may 
have wanted support at the U.N. but it did not demand that African states take sides in the 
Cold war.”185  
Though not concerned with the battle between communism and capitalism, Israel and 
Egypt were certainly engaged in a diplomatic battle for African friendship. Egypt and the 
Arab league warned the young nations about “Israel`s real intent” to become the new 
colonial power on the continent. At the 1958 First Conference of Independent African 
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States held in Accra, Egypt sought to brand Israel as a racist and imperialist power. At 
the Second Conference in Addis Ababa 1960, Egypt proposed that all African states sever 
ties with Israel. Ghana, Mali and Guinea eventually signed a treaty in 1961 known as the 
Casablanca treaty, denouncing Israel as an instrument of imperialist and neo-colonialist 
efforts in the Middle East as well as in Asia and Africa. The African states were however 
quick in signaling to Israel that they should not worry about the resolution and that 
their action would prove this.  An Egyptian effort to raise the Israel questions at the 
Organizations of African Unity (OAU) establishment in 1963 was shut down. The same 
thing occurred at the OAU Second Heads of State meeting in 1964.186 
 
Israel had since its friendships developed in Africa denounced South Africa’s apartheid. 
In 1960 Israel ‘relations to South Africa was strained, though a low-level diplomatic 
mission was maintained in Pretoria.187 The Sharpsville massacre in 1960 where 69 
people got killed, led to worldwide demonstrations and as the South African Foreign 
Minister spoke in the UN General Assembly in October 1961; “(...) Israeli diplomats, along 
with those from many countries, protested at the U.N. Israel voted with the African nations 
to censure South Africa and its leading anti-Semite before the eyes of the world.”188 Israel 
also supported the UN general Assembly`s sanction resolution of November 1961 calling 
for South Africa to abandon the apartheid policy.189 Meir followed through with 
supporting the volunteer arms-embargo against South Africa before the General 
Assembly in 1963 and denounced the apartheid system, as Prime minister Ben-Gurion 
also did at the Organization of African Unity`s founding convention the same year. In 
addition, Israel went as far as to recall their Ambassador from Pretoria.190 According to 
Levi Eshkol, Israel’s Prime Minister since 1963, South African leadership understood 
that the criticism came with the Israeli need for friendship with the newly independent 
African states. Condemning South Africa was also important as Israel could not support 
the African states on the matter of Algeria or French atomic tests.191 But some trade was 
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maintained also in 1960 when South Africa sold Israel an insignificant amount of 
uranium in 1960 and 10 tons of Yellowcake uranium compound in 1962192.The 
relationship to France was much more important for Israel in this first period, and as the 
French-Algerian war ended in 1962, concerns emerged that the relationship would 
change. French President de Gaulle eased this tension by assuring the current Israeli 
President Eshkol that Israel was both a friend and an ally.193 
 
Israel proved its diplomatic brinkmanship in this period in many different settings, 
obtaining arms, technology, friendship and even—in more ways than one—enemies. 
Eban who had attended the Argentine independence celebrations in 1960 on the 
instructions of Israel`s Cabinet later admitted that Eichmann was put on his plane as he 
returned to Israel. “His capture by Israeli intelligence agents was a brilliant enterprise.”194 
Through diplomacy the insult to Argentinian sovereignty was later repaired. Diplomacy 
was used to communicate intent, mutual interest and justify action. Diplomacy was used 
for self-interest, mutual gains and as an arena for deception. 
 
 
6.3 Israel in the international society 1965 – 1974 
 
6.3.1 Israel`s relations to the Institutions of Balance of Power and Great Powers 
 
The local balance of power situation of Israel in the Middle East 
Michael Brecher describes the balance of power in the region up until 1968 as being 
heavily influenced by the general balance of power situation; “This process, with multi 
power involvement, continued unabated through the sixties, assuming the proportions of 
an inflationary arms race. The Soviet Union equipped the armed forces of Egypt and Syria; 
France was the principal supplier of Israel`s Air Force; the UK and the US shared 
responsibility for Jordan and the US fed the Saudi Arabian military machine.”195 The 
Yemen War had since 1963 drained Egypt`s resources and divided the Arabs. Since the 
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Suez War Nasser had tried avoiding further war with Israel, seeking to develop the 
Egyptian economy and military.196 Israel, as Brecher pointed out; in reality belonged to 
no formal alliance. ”Thus Israel`s policy makers may be credited with a unique 
achievement—all the disadvantages of non-alignment and none of the benefits of 
alignment!”197 Israel`s main concern in 1964 was the increased cooperation between 
The Soviet Union and Syria. “There was more chance of enlisting the Arabs against the 
West than of utilizing Israel for that cause.”198 After the coup in 1966, Syria was led by an 
aggressive anti-Israeli government. The struggle for control of the demilitarized areas 
on the Israeli-Syrian border had been fought since 1948. Israel would take small pieces 
of these areas and hold on to them until they became Israeli territory, in turn provoking 
Syrian attacks. According to Waage Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Defense Minister (1967-
1974), admitted this was a conscious tactic.199 Foreign Minister Eban and Yitzhak Rabin 
the Chief of Staff at the IDF saw the conflicts as the result of Syrian border provocations 
and support of the guerilla group Fatah. Syria`s continuous attacks  throughout 1966 
Rabin later called a blessing in disguise that forced Israel to improve its military 
strength and intensified Israeli efforts to obtain tanks and military aircrafts from USA.200 
Israel had worked hard to achieve security guarantees, especially from the US. President 
Johnson was the first American President to supply Israel with offensive weapons in the 
shape of 210 tanks and 48 Skyhawk planes in 1966.201 “By 1966 the armed strength of 
Israel in relation to any Arab force likely to be pitted against us was no less formidable 
than it had been ten years before.”202 
 
In 1966 Egypt joined Syria in a defense pact in hoping to deter the aggression that had 
been escalating between Israel and Syria. Instead of creating deterrence, this alliance 
committed Nasser to take action if Israel went too far in its conflicts with Syria. When 
Israel shot down six Syrian fighter aircrafts in 1967, Nasser according to Waage, felt he 
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had to act to not seem weak. After ordering the UN troops away from Sinai a few days 
earlier, Nasser announced a blockade of the strait of Tiran for Israeli vessels on the 22nd 
of May.203 Eban claimed it was the Soviet Union that had convinced Nasser that an Israeli 
invasion of Syria was imminent, which then led to the blockade. Eban argued that the 
Soviet Union misled Egypt for the defense of Syria by providing false information.204 
According to Israel`s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Historical Documents Egypt misled 
itself. “But Nasser probably understood the Soviet information as a hint that the Soviet 
Union was persuaded that timing and circumstances were propitious for an assault on 
Israel (…)”205 Though Israel had warned its surroundings that a blockade of Israeli 
vessels through the Strait of Tiran would lead to an Israeli use of force, the French made 
it clear that any state launching a new war would lose French support. France had since 
the end of the Algerian war in 1962 sought improved relations with the Arab world, 
which had been difficult as Israel`s main arms supplier. When the Egyptian blockade 
went into effect, USA urged Israel to await an attack until diplomatic channels was 
exhausted. According to Eban USA was reluctant to act alone and tried to assembly an 
international fleet to lift the blockade while working on diplomatic solutions with Egypt. 
Israel feared going to war without American support, especially because of the threat of 
Soviet Union intervention.206 As it became clear that USA would not be able to remove 
Nasser`s blockade, Israel launched a preemptive attack on Egypt, Jordan and later 
Syria.207  
 
In spite of a crushing defeat in the Six Day War the Arab quantitative superiority in 
manpower and weapons was soon restored. “Within days of the end of hostilities the 
Soviets began to rush replacement weapons to both Egypt and Syria; and by May 1968, the 
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twentieth anniversary of Israel`s independence, the disparity had been eliminated.”208 The 
French, who had warned Israel to start the war, followed through on their threat and 
ceased the supply of Mirage fighters. They eventually placed an embargo on weapons 
sale to Israel.209 But Israel had two other gains in its balancing efforts; “Israel acquired 
control over territory more than three times the size of the state when the war began and, 
with it, a marked improvement in the defensive frontiers—the Jordan River, the Canal and 
the Syrian (Golan) Heights. Secondly, as in 1948 and 1956, victory enhanced the sense of 
security of Israeli society as a whole.”210  
The border bombardment continued in the canal-zone after the Six Day War, and 
became known as the War of Attrition, lasting until July 1970. To Rabin the War of 
Attrition was a waged by Egypt and the Soviet Union to weaken USA`s position in the 
Arab world. Equally; USA saw Israel’s gains as a loss for the Soviet Union.211 Waage saw 
Nasser`s maintained bombardment and aggression as an attempt to avoid a situation in 
which the canal became the new border. In 1970 Israel was frustrated with the amount 
of casualties suffered in the War of Attrition, and began to strike deeper into Egyptian 
territory with numerous air-raids, making significant impact on Egyptian infrastructure. 
USA used the raids and the threat of arming Israel further, to pressure the Soviet Union 
towards a cease-fire. To counter this, Nasser received ground-to-air missile systems, 
brand new MIG fighters with 200 trained pilots and new radar systems from the Soviet 
Union. As a consequence Israel had to stop its raids by April. USA managed to broker a 
peace agreement that Israel accepted by the end of July, by amongst other means, 
promising more economic and military supplies.212 “(…) at the end of 1970 Israel was in a 
condition of near total dependence on the United States.”213  
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Egypt was equally dependent on the Soviet Union. In September 1970 Nasser died and 
Anwar Sadat took charge in Egypt. According to Waage, Sadat felt that the Soviet Union 
kept the most advanced weaponry from Egypt in order to control them. She also claims 
that USA and the Soviet Union sought to maintain the status quo, preventing further 
confrontation. USA promised Israel after much negotiation that Israel would not be 
forced into making a peace-deal and took steps to improve Israeli military capability by 
providing large amounts of Skyhawk’s and Phantom aircrafts. In 1971 Sadat entered a 
formal friendship and cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union which now was 
committed to the defense of Egypt. In December Meir was promised another 42 
Phantoms and 92 Skyhawk aircrafts from the USA that would be delivered within three 
years, without any American demands for troop withdrawals.214 “(…) Mrs. Meir was 
assured that there would be no deal with the Soviet Union to exert pressure on Israel.”215 
Waage claims Nixon by this time saw Israel as a strategic advantage in the Cold War. In a 
meeting between the two heads of state of The Soviet Union and USA, the powers agreed 
to maintain status quo. Sadat was so infuriated by this that he ordered all Soviet Union 
personnel out of Egypt. But the relations improved quickly and Sadat received large 
amounts of advanced military technology and arms. In January 1973 Sadat aligned his 
forces with the Syrian army, putting them under joint command. Saudi Arabia was also 
frustrated with Israel`s expansion of territory and gave financial support to Sadat. The 
25th of September Jordan warned Israel of an imminent Syrian attack.216 
 
Nevertheless, Israel was caught off guard on Yom Kippur when the attack came. Once 
Israel after a while got the upper hand in the war, the Soviet Union began work to obtain 
a truce. According to Waage; Kissinger stalled this process in the Security Council so 
Israel could advance. USA had in the beginning been slow to react, not realizing the 
emergency of the situation for Israel. Both the Soviet Union and USA resupplied their 
respective allies, until Egypt yielded on October 19. Syria could not continue the war 
against Israel alone.217 According to Golda Meir, President Nixon promised on the 19th of 
                                                        
214
 Hilde Waage: Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 378-382. 
    Abba Eban: An Autobiography, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 478-479. 
    Yitzhak Rabin: The Rabin Memoirs, (Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979) p190, 208-210. 
215
 Yitzhak Rabin: The Rabin Memoirs, (Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979) p 209. 
216
 Hilde Waage: Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) 382-391. 
217
 Hilde Waage: Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 389-392. 
68 
 
October to continue the rebuilding of Israel military capability. She quoted his 
commitment in Knesset; “To maintain a balance of forces and thus achieve stability, the 
United States Government is currently providing military material to Israel to replace 
combat losses. This is necessary to prevent the emergence of a substantial imbalance 
resulting from a large-scale re-supply of Syria and Egypt by the Soviet Union”.218 
Negotiations between the Soviet Union and USA were initiated, but Israel continued to 
advance. “Moscow decided to embark on global intimidation.”219 USA eventually 
pressured Israel to accept a truce on the 25th of October. Israel won the war but lost its 
psychological advantage as undefeatable. Meanwhile the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), consisting of mainly Arab and African states, had decided to 
raise the price of oil during the Yom Kippur War in order to pressure USA and the West. 
The high oil price made these Arab states wealthy, while the West rationed oil, dealt 
with economic crisis, and unemployment.220  
 
Egypt turned its back on the Soviet Union after the Yom Kippur War, seeking a calm 
relationship with Israel in order to rebuild. USA`s Foreign Minister, Henry Kissinger took 
charge of the post war peace effort, but was, according to Waage, slowing the process. 
He made it seem as he was working for a return to the 1967 borders, while dividing the 
Arab unity; negotiating with one state at the time. In January 1974 Kissinger managed to 
get an agreement between Israel and Egypt where Israel withdrew from territory west 
of the Suez Canal. It was the beginning of a step by step withdrawal process that would 
last until 1978 when Egypt recognized the state of Israel, and Israel withdrew from all of 
Sinai. In this agreement known as the Sinai I agreement USA also promised to be 
adherent to Israel`s security needs on a long-term basis. In the end of May, Kissinger 
also facilitated an agreement between Israel and Syria stabilizing the cease-fire on both 
fronts. USA erased a large amount of Israeli debt in order to finalize the deal.221 Rabin, 
Israel`s new Prime Minister by 1974 focused on acquiring arms and military equipment. 
“Only a very powerful IDF could convince the Arab leaders that the only course open to 
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them was political negotiations.”222 Shimon Peres argues that the Yom Kippur War 
changed the balance in two significant ways. It had given Sadat a sufficient victory to 
negotiate peace built on compromise, and a sufficient defeat to realize that Egypt could 
never force its will on Israel.223 This facilitated further negotiations, and in September 
1974 Rabin agreed to withdraw Israeli forces another 30-50 km in return for a “(…) 
delivery of $750 million worth of arms.”224 The central role of USA in the peace process 
gave it an advantage in the region.225 
 
In Africa throughout this second period, Israel`s prime strategic concern focused on the 
Horn of Africa. In order to ensure free Israeli navigation through the Red Sea, Israel 
assisted the Ethiopian government in fighting Eritrean rebels. In return Israel was 
allowed to build naval bases on some islands off the Eritrean coast. In 1966 the Israeli 
army was the second largest foreign delegation in Ethiopia after the Americans.226 “After 
Ethiopia, the second largest Israeli military presence was in Uganda.”227 Israel trained the 
Ugandan army since 1965 and instructed their air force. Uganda was important mainly 
for its border against Sudan where Israel was assisting the south-Sudanese. The 
Sudanese government supported and received support from Egypt. According to Joel 
Peters, Israel was using the Sudanese conflict to drain or potentially drain Egyptian 
resources until 1972 when the civil war ended.228 Israel did however also contribute in 
the economic and commercial development of many African states by initiating joint 
ventures with integrated training programs aimed at having local personnel taking over 
those ventures. In return, Israel gained access to new markets, exporting medicine, 
agricultural machinery etc. while importing primary products such as diamonds and 
uranium. Most of the ventures were successful and helped build the economic 
infrastructure in many states; including Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya 
and Uganda.229 Uganda did eventually sever all ties with Israel in 1972, and in January 
1973 Niger, Chad and Congo-Brazzaville followed after pressure from Libya and Algeria. 
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Twenty more African States severed tied with Israel during the Yom Kippur War.230 
Facing this loss of influence in this part of Africa Israel began to expand its relations with 
South Africa and the states surrounding it. By 1974 Peres initiated a cooperation with 
South Africa`s defense ministry and arms industry officials.231 
 
Nuclear Deterrence 
Israel continued the work that was initiated with French help at Dimona in 1960. In 
spite of condemning South Africa for its apartheid policy and the Israeli support for the 
ongoing arms embargo against South Africa, Israel and the apartheid state entered a 
bilateral agreement in 1965 that would enable Israel to purchase uranium compound. 
This new agreement was a safeguard agreement in which Israel agreed to stockpile the 
uranium and not use it for military purpose. It also contained annual South African 
inspections of Israel’s facilities and operating records. Israel tried to hide its true 
capability and advances in the field of nuclear weaponry from USA. At the same time 
Israel remained ambiguous about its capacity in order to deter enemies. Before the Six 
Day War Israel had built its first nuclear devices. USA became more or less aware of this 
after the war, but did not realize the extent. In 1968 Mossad smuggled an additional 200 
ton yellowcake uranium compound into Israel. By the time of the Yom Kippur War Israel 
had approximately a dozen nuclear weapons. Polakow-Suransky claims that Israel, 
desperate after heavy losses, contacted USA on the 9th of October where they threatened 
to deploy the nuclear arsenal.232 “The Nixon administration abruptly reversed course and 
agreed to resupply Israel the next day despite opposition from Pentagon officials, who 
believed Israel would eventually win the war and did not want to antagonize the Arabs.”233 
As Israel`s post-colonial friendships ended, diplomatic ties to South Africa grew warmer. 
Polakow-Suransky claim it the American reluctance to deliver arms in the beginning of 
the Yom Kippur War convinced Israel to expand the domestic arms industry. This 
industry grew fast, quickly becoming Israel`s biggest export with South Africa as a 
perfect customer. In November 1974 Defense Minister Peres met secretly with South 
African leaders to build defense cooperation.234 “Beginning in 1974, the two governments 
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began holding biannual gatherings for Defense Ministry and arms industry officials. 
Likewise, military intelligence officials convened annually, alternating between Tel Aviv 
and Pretoria, to discuss strategic cooperation.”235 
 
Power maximizing 
Israel was in this second period engaged in either war or military border clashes more 
or less constantly. As a consequence Israel was in my opinion power maximizing in all 
aspects in order to match its enemies, even more so than in the first period. This was 
evident after the Yom Kippur War in particular, when Israel initiated defense 
cooperation with South Africa and put a lot of resources into building its own arms 
industry. It was a constant battle to obtain more arms, better nuclear capability and 
security guarantees from America. “.. Israel has responded to her geographical liabilities 
and maximized her countervailing assets.”236 
 
The Middle East as a sphere of influence 
In this second period spheres of influence seemed more settled in the region than what 
it had been 1955-1964. The Baghdad pact was operational throughout this period and 
the spheres of influence in the Middle East remained largely unchanged until after the 
Yom Kippur War when Egypt turned its back on the Soviet Union and Israel was 
shunned in post-colonialist Africa.237 Lebanon, which had remained friendly to the West 
now experienced new inner turmoil after Israel`s victory in the Six Day War and the 
following occupation. Lebanon had received many Palestinian refugees since 1948, and 
its own Arab population was sympathetically to their cause. The Six Day War radicalized 
many of the Arabic nationalist in all of the Middle East. With large demonstrations 
erupting in 1968, bloody confrontation occurred between Lebanese military and 
Palestinian forces. The Palestinians established forces in South Lebanon from where 
they launched attacks into Israeli territory. Israel replied with an attack on the airport of 
Beirut signaling to Lebanon that it was held accountable for attacks from Lebanese 
territory. As the Christian Lebanese President held the Palestinians responsible and not 
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the Israelis he provoked the non-Christian population. By 1969 Lebanon asked Nasser 
for help to stop clashes between the Palestinian militants and the Lebanese army. The 
result was known as the Cairo agreement and allowed PLO to attack Israel from 
Lebanese territory and gave them control of the Palestinian refugee camps. Opposing 
the increasing influence of the PLO, different Christian militias was forming, seeking a 
Christian state and a pro-Western government. In 1970 more Palestinians immigrated 
to Lebanon in large numbers as King Hussein of Jordan had chased them out. By 1974 
the tension in Lebanon was escalating beyond control resulting in a civil war the 
following spring.238  
 
Waage claims that in spite of its close ties to the Soviet Union, Syria never was a Soviet 
Union satellite state. Syria was simply using Soviet Union assistance to achieve its goals 
in a mutual dependence relationship. Syria had no interest in Communism regarding it 
as a dangerous rival to the pan-Arabic cause. According to Waage the Soviet Union had 
to balance its needs for more bases and influence in the region, the Arabic need for 
weaponry and the danger of provoking USA and Israel. Syria did not provide the Soviet 
Union with the influence in its internal affairs or the region that it sought. The 
humiliating defeat of the Six Day War was unacceptable to Syria who immediately 
started to build its strength. It convinced the Soviet Union to provide vast amounts of 
arms and by 1973 Syria had quadrupled the size of its standing army. As Egypt turned 
its back on the Soviet Union after the Yom Kippur War, Syria remained in the alliance.239 
 
Jordan enjoyed Western support and progress in almost every aspect until 1967. Egypt 
and Syria had pressured Jordan into allowing PLO to operate from their territory. The 
Six Day War led to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and large amounts of 
Palestinian refugees into Jordan. In 1970 King Hussein of Jordan launched an operation 
against the increasingly powerful Palestinian guerilla groups operating within Jordan in 
what later was known as “Black September”. Syria sent armored units to assist the 
Palestinian groups and King Hussein reached out to Israel through USA, asking for 
Israeli air-force assistance against Syria. Rabin claim Kissinger stated that the operation 
had US government approval and support. IDF mobilized reinforcements on the Golan 
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Heights and Syria cancelled their advance into Jordan and soon withdrew their forces 
that had already crossed the border.240 Rabin quotes Kissinger from a phone call 25th of 
September; “The president will never forget Israel`s role in preventing the deterioration in 
Jordan and in blocking the attempt to overturn the regime there. He said that the United 
States is fortunate in having an ally like Israel in the Middle East. These events will be 
taken into account in all future developments.”241 
Israel and Jordan established themselves well within the American sphere of interest in 
this period. Egypt left the Soviet Union sphere, seeking to move forward by improving 
its relations to the West. The Soviet Union had made a large achievement by its Egyptian 
arms deal in 1955, and was equally weakened by Sadat new decision. Lebanon became 
the most unstable state in the region while Syria remained in its alliance with the Soviet 
Union.  
 
Israel’s relation to the Great Power management 
In the stages leading up to the Six Day War USA urged Israel not to apply military action 
as long as political contacts were still in place. When USA`s efforts to gather an 
international fleet for intervention towards the blockade failed, Israel clearly calculated 
their further action based on how the great powers would react. 242“Eban described our 
political position succinctly: we were isolated; none of the powers would come to our 
assistance. If a cease fire resolution were introduced in the Security Council, there was 
good reason to believe that it would be passed without any objections. He estimated that if 
we went to war, the IDF would have from twenty-four to seventy-two hours before 
international intervention halted operations. Consequently, time was the decisive factor. 
An army does not go to war without the fundamental conviction that it is capable of 
achieving its objectives.”243 Israel warned USA that they were launching an attack in fear 
of being shunned. “And without the United States to keep Soviet involvement in check, 
Israel would be in a tough predicament.”244 
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The Prime Minister of the Soviet Union used the “red line” (a direct telephone-line 
connection between USA and the Soviet Union established after the Cuba-crisis), in an 
attempt to stop the Six Day War. The Soviet Union wanted to arrange an immediate 
truce and demanded USA condemned the Israeli aggression. 10th of June the Soviet 
Union threatened with military force and the Americans began pressuring Israel to stop 
its actions. USA sent a naval fleet to Mediterranean to show force, but the war was over 
before the situation escalated. In the negotiations the Soviet Union first demanded 
Israeli withdrawal to the pre-war borders. As Israel became increasingly successful on 
the ground the Soviet Union dropped the withdrawal demand and sought to end 
hostilities first and foremost.245 During the War of Attrition, Rabin observed a change in 
the American view of Israel`s role after the successful deep penetration air-raids into 
Egypt. During the War of Attrition, Golda Meir was skeptical about the Security Council`s 
ability to achieve a just solution in the matter. “How could it? The Russians were feeding 
and manipulating the entire Egyptian war effort; the French were almost as pro-Arab as 
the Russians; the British were not far behind the French ; only the Americans were at all 
concerned with Israel`s survival.”246 USA made promises to resupply Israel in its 
balancing efforts against Egypt, but demanded a cease fire. Later USA turned to Israel for 
military assistance during “Black September” and was very appreciative of the Israeli 
efforts for that cause.247 During the Yom Kippur War Israel was frustrated by USA`s late 
commitment to bring the arms that Israel felt it depended on. Israel`s move to threaten 
with deploying the nuclear arsenal indicate both desperation but also arguably an 
advanced brinkmanship in their great power management.248 Other than forcing its 
allied great power into action we must also consider Israel’s ability to stand up to the 
great power of the Soviet Union throughout this period facing continuous indirect and 
direct threats of destruction. Only the formality of Egyptian ownership of the aircrafts 
was between direct confrontations with the Soviet Union itself who provided planes, 
pilots and support staff. The good relationship to France was destroyed with the launch 
of the Six Day War as Israel disregarded the French warning to attack first. Insult was 
added to injury as Israel retrieved the missile boat from French territory.249 
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6.3.2 Israel`s relation to the institutions of International Law, War and Diplomacy 
 
Israel`s relation to the principle of Sovereignty 
If enemy states were behind the success of guerilla operations and sabotage within 
Israel it may not have been possible to prove easily, and in turn legitimize a state on 
state attack. By provoking attacks from its enemies Israel could claim some legitimacy 
for a response towards a legitimate state opponent. Waage claims that Israel`s 
continuous border confrontation with Syria was to a large degree a conscious effort to 
take control of the demilitarized areas and provoke attacks to which Israel could react. 
Israel shot down six Syrian fighter jets and humiliated Syrian airspace and military by 
flying low over Damascus in April 1967. Nasser replied by closing the Strait of Tiran, an 
act of war in the view of Israel, who had warned their intent to protect their access 
through the strait which was considered an international water-way. Israel`s launched 
the Six Day War in 1967, claiming it was fending off an imminent attack, referring to the 
Egyptian mobilization on Sinai, the Jordanian mobilization on the West bank and the 
Syrian mobilization on the northern border.250 Closing the Strait of Tiran was not a 
direct violation of Israeli territorial sovereignty and launching an attack claiming that an 
attack is imminent, is not the same as defending against an ongoing attack. Once again 
the roles of aggressor and defender are blurred. The result of the war was an Israeli 
occupation of Sinai, Gaza, the Golan Heights, and West Bank, as well as a closure of the 
Suez Canal. Israel held on to its new territorial gains, using it as bargaining to achieve 
agreements that would secure its people and territory. “But this time, the price for our 
withdrawal was going to be very high, higher than it had been in 1956. This time the price 
would be peace, permanent peace, peace by treaty based on agreed and secured 
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borders.”251 The War of Attrition that followed and ultimately the Yom Kippur War must 
be seen as a direct consequence of this occupation. Israel was occupying the sovereign 
territories of its enemies in order to secure its own. To Meir, Nasser’s mobilization on 
Sinai and the closing of Tiran in 1967 had proved that Israel should never have retreated 
in 1956 without obtaining definite pacts of non-aggression and regional 
disarmament.252 
 
Israel continued to hold its neighbors directly responsible for attacks on Israeli territory 
as it had done with Syria in 1966-1967.253 This was signaled very clearly by the bombing 
of the Beirut International airport in 1968. Israel demonstrated the same willingness to 
cross borders to reach its enemies in Jordan, as in the Karameh battle the same year 
proved.254 But Israel was as the Eichmann case demonstrated, not afraid to seek up its 
enemies on a global scale. Other than operating in its hostile neighboring countries, 
Mossad struck targets in Nicosia, Paris and Athens during 1972-1973.255 These very 
successful operations ended in failure with the murder of an innocent man in 
Lillehammer in 1973 after a failed identification. The operation was very damaging to 
relations between Norway and Israel. Israel denied responsibility, claiming it was done 
by private individuals. Former Mossad leader Mike Harari admitted for the first time in a 
very recent interview with the Israeli paper “Yedioth Aharonoth” that the state of Israel 
was behind the murder.256 Could such acts qualify as self-defense if we assume these 
targets would strike again against Israel? Or if we assume the assassinations have a 
deterring effect? It is nevertheless undoubtedly breaches of sovereignty towards states 
Israel sought friendly relations with.  
 
Israel`s relation to the principle of Respecting Agreements  
USA started the supply of offensive weapons to Israel by 1966, thus ending the American 
embargo. The arms sales were made conditional on Israel disclosing their nuclear 
activities, but USA was deceived as Israel fooled their inspectors. As for the war itself, 
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Israel may argue that peaceful solutions were sought in accordance to the Charter 
(Article 33), and failed with USA`s inability to mobilize an international fleet to lift the 
blockade of the Tiran Strait. Nevertheless, Article 39 of the UN Charter clearly states 
that; “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.” Israel`s decision to launch the attack had little to do 
with any UN approval. But Israel was frustrated with UN after the UN retreat from Sinai 
and the constant vetoing by the Soviet Union against Israel. Israel claimed legitimacy for 
the war as an act of self-defense against imminent danger and as law-enforcing on the 
grounds of the international support it had received for the status of the Strait of Tiran 
and Gulf of Aqaba as international waterway.257 
The Six Day War also marked the beginning of the French arms embargo, which Israel to 
some degree managed to circumvent using backdoor channels and connections within 
the French defense establishment and arms manufacturers. France also refused to 
deliver five Missile boats that Israel had already purchased, in turn breaking their 
agreement with Israel. Israeli Navy crews were sent to France in 1969 on an undercover 
operation and retrieved the ships from the harbor of Cherbourg. These members of the 
Israeli Navy violated French territorial sovereignty, forcing France into keeping its 
arms-deal.258  
 
Israel itself however was no closer in honoring its agreement with the IAEA not to 
produce nuclear material for military purposes, or its agreement with the USA not to 
produce plutonium.259 USA and IAEA were not informed about Israel`s 1965 bilateral 
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safeguard agreement for uranium sale with South Africa, nor the stockpiling of uranium 
that followed. “It included detailed provisions forbidding the use of South African uranium 
for atomic weapons or weapons research (…).”260  Based on Polakow-Suransky`s 
interview of South Africa`s former administrator of the Atomic Energy Board`s uranium 
enrichment program, it was the initial 10 tons of uranium compound bought in 1961 
that was used to create Israel’s first nuclear weapons, not the stockpile accumulated by 
the agreement. Israel had produced nuclear devices already by the Six Day War and USA 
became more or less aware of Israel`s capabilities after the Six Day War.261 Israel`s 
relationship to South Africa was blooming in the early 70`s in sharp contrast to UN`s 
increasingly hostile stand against apartheid as was re-announced in 1968; “The General 
Assembly requested all States and organisations "to suspend cultural, educational, sporting 
and other exchanges with the racist regime and with organisations or institutions in South 
Africa which practice apartheid.”262 According to Polakow-Suransky UN`s Special 
Committee Against Apartheid was collecting evidence in 1974 that Israel was assisting 
the Apartheid state in avoiding the European boycott of South African products such as 
textiles and fruits. The same year Israel had begun holding biannual meeting with South 
African Defense Ministry and arms industry officials, a clear violation of any UN 
resolution or request calling for a stop of trade and cooperation with the apartheid state. 
Golda Meir’s promise in 1963 at the UN General Assembly, that Israel would uphold the 
Security Council Resolution 181 to cease the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition 
and military vehicles to South Africa seemed endangered by Israel`s need to export arms 
from its booming arms-industry and from and the new defense cooperation.263 
 
Israel`s relation to the principle of restricting violence 
The amount of aggression in this period does not indicate that a restriction of violence 
was prioritized. In the Six Day War Israel had not been willing to stop its campaign until 
it had achieved its desired objectives. The arms race and violence spiral that followed do 
little to hide the fact that restriction of violence was subordinated other considerations. 
If Israel`s can be said to be violence restricting, then the argument must be found in 
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Israel`s conviction that forcing the Arabs into recognizing Israel as a state and respecting 
its borders was the only way to secure peace and security ahead. One could also argue 
that Israel was violence restricting by not implementing its nuclear arsenal during the 
Six Day War, and in particular during the Yom Kippur War when Israel was under heavy 
pressure. It may be argued that Israel`s acquisition of nuclear weaponry in itself was 
violence restricting, first as an ambiguous deterrent towards enemies, and later as it 
forced USA to provide arms and pressure for a quick Israeli victory. All in all in this 
second period of 1965-1974, Israel`s application of violence seem to be based on 
provoking an enemy state attack in order to get to those they saw as responsible for 
both the internal security threats as well as border shelling and insurgency. The method 
was not violence restricting regardless of intent. 
 
Israel`s relation to the institution of War  
 
Material War 
Israel was engaged in material acts of war almost continuously throughout this second 
period. Waage claim there was around 100 attacks on Israel between January 1965 and 
June 1967 by various terrorist organizations.264 This was mostly limited to the Israeli-
Syrian clashes in the demilitarized zones to the north and on the Jordanian border 
where Fatah guerilla activist operated, but it was also carried out deep within Israeli 
territory.265 “ Israel continued its policy of keeping its neighbors responsible. (…) 
sometimes the Jordan authorities lost control of areas in which terrorists operated against 
Israel. In November 1966 the village of Samua, near Hebron, suffered havoc when Israeli 
forces moved to clean out terrorist bases.”266 Waage describe this attack as a revenge on 
the inhabitants of the village for hiding Fatah members. It was also meant to pressure 
Jordan`s King Hussein to not let Fatah operate on Jordanian soil. The operation failed 
and became much more extensive than planned, leading to UN Security Council 
condemnation. It also failed to act deterring upon the Jordanian King who now was 
convinced Israel was going to take the West-bank regardless of how he dealt with the 
guerilla groups on his territory.267  
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To Eban it was Syria`s competition with Egypt for Arab leadership that was the cause of 
border confrontations to the north, which ultimately led to the Six Day War. Israel was 
to be destroyed through what Syria called “revolutionary activism”, now manifested 
through constant guerilla operations within Israel and by bombardment of the northern 
settlements. Israel responded by shooting three Syrian aircrafts in 1966 while suffering 
attacks on the Sea of Galilee.268According to Waage, Moshe Dayan, Israel`s Defense 
Minister since 1967 admitted Israeli provocation in the northern demilitarized zones 
were part of a deliberate effort to provoke an military response from Syria. Syria 
pressured Egypt to take responsibility as the leading force of the Arab world and to join 
them in a defense pact. Such a pact was established in November 1966 and Egypt was 
now obliged to react to escalations to the conflict. “In fact, it was a clash in which our 
planes downed six Syrian aircraft in April 1967 that sparked the process that climaxed in 
the Six Day War.”269 Nasser did not react with force to the situation, claiming Egypt 
would aid only if Syria suffered sustained warfare, not spasmodic incidents. Syria 
constantly pressured the Soviet Union for arms and assistance. The Soviet Union in turn 
pressured Egypt to come to Syria`s assistance, and even falsely reported an Israeli 
mobilization towards Syria.270  
 
Nasser mobilized part of his army towards Sinai on May 15th as Israel went into 
heightened awareness.271 “Had we failed to react—giving the Egyptians the impression 
that we were either unaware of their moves or complacent about them—we might be 
inviting attack on grounds of vulnerability.”272 May 17th Egypt raised the stakes and 
demanded the removal of UN forces from Sinai and their retreat to Gaza. As a reply UN 
Secretary General U Thant challenged Nasser with a dilemma. All UN forces stay in 
current position, or all are removed. Nasser ordered them to leave, in Rabin`s opinion to 
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save face.273 UN forces retreated by 19th of May, but; “(…) the Egyptians had still not 
presented us with a concrete casus belli to justify launching a full scale war.”274 Threats 
alone were not valid as a declaration of war. In a speech to Arab trade unionist on the 
26th of May 1967 he stated; “The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will 
be to destroy Israel.”275 Israel had communicated very clearly its intent to regard the 
closure of the Tiran Strait as a declaration of war. There can be no doubt that these 
warnings reached Cairo. One thing was now clear. If Nasser imposed a blockade, the 
explosion would not ensue from “miscalculation” but from an open-eyed and conscious 
readiness for war.”276 
 
May 23rd the Strait of Tiran was blocked by Nasser. To the north Syria was mobilizing its 
troops. America was committed to the survival of Israel in the events of an Egyptian 
attack but this assistance was not guaranteed if Israel initiated military action. 
Nevertheless, Israel launched its War on the 5th of June after USA`s international 
endeavor to assemble a fleet to lift the blockade failed.277 Waage points out that the UN 
had not registered a single Israeli ship through the passage the last two years.278  “If we 
don`t face that challenge the IDF`s deterrent capability will become worthless. (…) Which 
power will bother to support a small state that has ceased to be a military factor? (…) 
We`re going to war over freedom of navigation. Nasser has threatened Israel`s standing; 
later he will threaten Israel`s very existence.”279  
 
As the name would indicate the Six Day War was short and fought with great efficiency 
by Israel. With its massive territorial gains of the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and 
the West Bank, Israel developed a new strategy of holding on to the conquered territory 
in order to achieve permanent borders. Israel wanted the pre-war borders with Egypt 
and Syria to become permanent in exchange for withdrawing from Sinai and the Golan 
Heights. Egypt and Syria both rejected the proposal. Within a few weeks bombardment 
began at the new Suez line between Israel and Egypt. The hostilities kept escalating 
                                                        
273
 Yitzhak Rabin: The Rabin Memoirs, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p67-71. 
274
 Yitzhak Rabin: The Rabin Memoirs, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p71. 
    Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement by President Nasser to Arab Trade Unionists- 26 May 1967 
(08.04.14) 
276
 Abba Eban: An Autobiography, Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977, p328. 
277
 Yitzhak Rabin: The Rabin Memoirs, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p88-95. 
278
 Hilde Waage: Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten, Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013, 343. 
279
 Yitzhak Rabin: The Rabin Memoirs, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p81. 
82 
 
towards October 1967 when the Israeli destroyer Eliat was sunk by Egyptian artillery. 
Artillery battles were fought throughout the fall of 1968, and Israel began striking 
deeper into Egypt striking vital infrastructure. Israel dug in on its side of the canal, 
building the Bar Lev-line consisting of 35 massive defense fortresses.280 Brecher points 
to Israel`s success as being rooted in an existential awareness. “In 1969 Chief of Staff Bar-
Lev noted three advantages over the Arabs—human material, firepower, and the strategic 
depth of the administered areas. All these Israeli assets were important. But the most 
important the pervasive and deep-rooted consciousness of “ein breirah”—“no alternative”; 
the price of defeat was universally held to be extinction.”281 
 
After many casualties throughout 1969 and massive shelling back and forth Israel 
decided to change strategy. With American blessing Israel began January 1970 with 
extensive bombing of Egypt, counting 3300 air-raids. As a reply, Moscow sent large 
amounts of personnel and military equipment including 200 pilots, radar systems and 
MiG fighters. The Soviet Union pilots were so efficient that Israel stopped its raids by 
April. By the end of July a truce was installed282 
While the War of Attrition had been waged with Egypt more or less constantly since the 
Six Day War until 1970, Israel continued holding its other neighbors accountable for 
attacks by guerilla group operating from their territories. In Jordan, Israel attacked the 
village of Karameh in 1968.  In Lebanon, Israel struck the Beirut international Airport 
the same year.  
 
Since the truce in 1970 Israel felt relatively safe in its security situation. “Yet while it was 
evident that terrorism would increase, the general feeling in Israel was that the favorable 
military balance, the strong support of Israel by the United States, and the weakening of 
Egyptian-Soviet relations, all made the outbreak of war with our neighbors a remote 
contingency.”283 In 1972 Abba Eban was worried by the confident tone of Rabin and the 
Israeli leadership. “The logic was that if the Arabs were unable to get their territories back 
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by war or by Great Power pressure, they would have to seek negotiation and to satisfy 
some of Israel`s security interests. This view made no provision for a third Arab option-
neither docility nor negotiation, but a desperate recourse to war in the hope that even an 
unsuccessful attack would be more rewarding than passive acceptance of the cease-fire 
lines.” 284 Waage also see the Yom kipper War as resulting from this attitude. Israel and 
USA rejected all of Sadat`s initiatives for peace and negotiation in 1971, giving him only 
one option.285 . The confidence of Israel was also demonstrated by other events. 1972-
1973 was the period in which Mossad was most active in hunting down Israel`s enemies 
abroad. Nevertheless Israel still took potential threats very serious. The 21th of 
February 1973 Israel shot down a Libyan airliner that due to sandstorms and equipment 
error flew inn over the Sinai Peninsula. The Israeli`s took no chances fearing it was 
headed for the Dimona facilities. Most of the 108 dead were Egyptians and Libyans. 286 In 
September Israel shot down 13 Syrian aircrafts in an incident that according to Eban 
made him think of the events leading up to the Six Day War. Both Israeli and American 
intelligence however were not worried.287 As Kissinger told Eban; “In any case, nothing 
dramatic is going to happen in October.”288 Egypt and Syria launched its attack October 6 
on Yom Kippur. It ended on October 25th after yet another victory to Israel. In spite of 
Israel advancing far into Syria and Egypt towards their capitols, the Arabs celebrated the 
war as a victory that had proven that Israel was not invincible. 
 
Israel`s relation to the Institution of Diplomacy  
In 1966 there had been few developments in Israel’s contact with the Arab world since 
The Suez War. According to Eban, Ben-Gurion saw no chance of reconciliation until 
Israel reached sufficient stability and strength to convince the Arabs of their permanent 
presence.289 
Towards the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact states, Prime Minister Eshkol was 
seeking a more conciliatory line than Ben-Gurion, at least up until the Six Day War. 
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Eshkol stated that Israel was not a part of any “Cold War” and went on to point out 
similarities in Israel`s and The Soviet Union’s policy. A symbolic payment of 
compensation for Tsarist property in Jerusalem was also made. Relations were also 
improved with Romania and Poland. Eshkol paid necessary tribute to France, but saw US 
as more reliable and important partner. He also tried improving diplomatic ties with 
China which he saw as a rising power. “(...) he frequently expressed an interest in 
diplomatic relations with Peking, acknowledging China’s significance in global politics.”290 
Ties were also greatly improved with Germany as Eshkol called for reconciliation. But he 
was not foreign to calling the past to the West German attention when he saw fit to 
apply pressure, reminding the Germans that relations was still under some 
evaluation.291 “Finally, in this catalogue of power assets and liabilities, there was Israel`s 
victory in securing diplomatic relations with West Germany in the spring of 1965, despite 
persistent efforts by the UAR-led group of Arab states; they not only failed to thwart this 
link but also revealed power weakness and disunity in the process.”292  
 
Abbas Eban, Israel`s top diplomat, had lost his faith in the UN. “I took a hard look at our 
situation in Western Europe. My belief was that the United Nations had lost its importance, 
and that the Arab preponderance against Israel had made it impossible for us to avoid 
hostile decisions there. The real weight of international relations was moving into regional 
channels.”293 Eban was referring to regional organizations such as NATO, the 
Organization of American States (OAS) and The European Economic Community (EEC) 
where he saw states seeking military and economic security. 
 
Waage claim that as events escalated before the Six Day War, Eshkol sent Eban to 
Washington with strong demands for American support and an exaggerated portray of 
the potential of an Arab attack. Israel wanted an American statement that an attack on 
Israel was an attack on USA, and a coordination of American troops in the Middle East 
with Israeli troops to resist potential attacks. USA declined as Israel had hoped 
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according to Waage, as this would be the Israeli rationale for attacking first. USA made it 
clear that an Arab attack was not imminent and warned Israel from striking first. When 
the head of Mossad returned from a meeting in Washington with CIA and Pentagon he 
had received strong signals that an Israeli attack would not involve the loss of American 
support. In his memoirs, Rabin does not conceal that there was eager for war among 
many members of the military leadership, but he also claim he and many others in the 
political leadership struggled immensely with the decision, to the brink of exhaustion. 
Eshkol finally made the decision to go to war as they feared the diplomatic work in 
Washington between the Egyptians and USA would lead them to a compromise that was 
less than optimal for Israel.294 
 
Israel depended on slow progress in the UN Security Council, delaying a cease-fire 
resolution in order to achieve its military goals. Israel’s UN ambassador Gideon Rafael 
contacted his American equivalent asking him to be unavailable for the Soviet Union UN 
Ambassador on the first day of the war. The Soviet soon dropped its previous demands 
in the Security Council for condemnation of Israel and a total withdrawal of Israeli 
forces, on the 6th of June. As Israel went on to take the Golan Heights the 10th of June, the 
Soviet Union gave up on diplomatic relations with Israel.295 “On 13 June, the Soviet Union 
having broken off diplomatic relations with Israel three days previously, followed by 
Bulgaria, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Guinea, asked that a special 
emergency session of the General Assembly be convened.”296 As a consequence, Eshkol 
abandoned attempts of diplomatic friendship towards the East, denouncing the 
repression of Jews in the USSR and the supply of arms to Israel`s enemies. In its peace 
negotiations with the Arabs, Israel demanded to negotiate with one state at the time. 
Israel would not withdraw without getting recognized borders. A withdrawal from 
Jerusalem was non-negotiable, while the Palestinian refugee problem was to be solved 
through negotiation and peace-agreements. USA promised not to support any Security 
Council decision in this matter that would go against Israel`s demands. In the end of 
November the Security Council agreed upon Resolution 242. Israel did not see Arab 
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recognition of the resolution as a sufficient recognition of its borders and refused to 
withdraw. 297  
 
Waage claim Sadat went far in 1971 to achieve diplomatic solutions with Israel after the 
War of Attrition. He offered to re-open the Suez Canal if Israel withdrew 48 km east from 
the canal. At the same time UN negotiator Gunnar Jarring tried to force the parts closer 
to a solution. In these talks Egypt was willing to sign a peace agreement, but demanded 
Israel also gave up Gaza and returned to its pre-war borders with Syria and Jordan, 
meaning an exit of Israeli forces from East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Israel 
responded by refusing the deal. By December all negotiation was stranded as Israel was 
promised that USA would not pressure Israel into any deals. To Eban It was this failure 
to offer Egypt any diplomatic victories that gave Sadat the realization that he had little to 
lose by launching a new war.298 
 
Diplomatic Relations in Africa 
“As to the third world, he was the only Israeli Prime Minister to visit Africa (in May-June 
1966); and while there, as well as in his assessment of his tour of seven new states, he 
indicated that Africa loomed large in his global image.”299 In spite of Eshkol’s 
continuation of Meir’s friendly policy towards post-colonial Africa, the events of the Six 
Day War and the Yom Kippur war in particular would change this blooming relation. 
 
Diplomatic relations between Israel and South Africa had been minimal throughout the 
60`s. This changed with the closure of the Straight of Tiran in the Six Day War aftermath. 
The war branded Israel as a colonial outpost of the West where the Arabs were the 
underdogs. All the East African states were struggling financially with the closure of 
Suez, and were soon blaming Israel who would not retreat from Sinai. South Africa, on 
the other hand, experienced a boom in shipping activity and trade—as vessels had to be 
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re-routed around the African Horn. In 1969 Israel sent Yitzhak Unna to South Africa to 
become the new Consul General, working subtlety on improving relations.300  
 
“By the early 1970s, with Israel`s image as a socialist bastion tarnished by occupation and 
Arab states attempting to lure African countries to their side with promises of cheap oil, 
Meir’s dream of a staunchly Zionist African continent was fading. (…) Peres, Dayan and 
Rabin saw Israel`s security as paramount and they were willing to make moral 
compromises in order to ensure it. It was precisely this worldview that gave birth to the 
alliance with South Africa.”301 South Africa supplied Israel with coal and rough-stones for 
Israel’s diamond industry and in 1972 an official South African mission opened in Tel 
Aviv. The same year Uganda`s Idi Amin cut all ties to Israel, turning to Libya and the 
Soviet Union while Israel changed its focus and opened Missions in Botswana, Swaziland 
and Lesotho, states in geographical proximity and economic dependency of South 
Africa.302 On the 25th of September Israel informed South Africa that they would no 
longer vote against South Africa in the UN nor take the initiative on denouncing 
Pretoria.303  
 
In the beginning of 1973 Libya and Algeria pressured members of the OAU to sever ties 
with Israel, which Chad, Niger and Congo-Brazzaville did in January. Eban managed to 
get an aid and cooperation agreement in place with Burkina-Faso in September before 
the Yom Kippur War in October. After the Yom Kippur War, Israel was the military 
victor, but it had lost the propaganda war.304 “Egypt framed the Yom Kippur War as a 
Zionist invasion of the African continent, and twenty more African states severed ties 
during the fighting.”305 But as Peters points out it was also a matter of Israel`s military 
presence in Ethiopia, Uganda and other African states.  “By involving itself in many of the 
regional conflicts on the continent, Israel managed only to foster a negative image of its 
presence in Africa. (…)In November 1973 a meeting of the African Heads of Missions and 
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OAU representative in Europe issued a statement expressing their concern at the role 
played by Israel in assisting secessionist movements in Africa.”306 
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In this chapter I will conduct a discussion based upon the document analysis, aimed at 
answering the research questions. The discussion reflects how Israel relations to the 
norms rules and practices of international society has enabled and restrained Israel, 




1. What do the actions of Israel in the international society of states from 1955 to 
1974 reveal about Israel’s relation to the framework of norms, rules and 
practices of the international society of states?  
2. How can Israel’s relationship towards the international rules, norms and 
practiced be said to influence its relationship towards Africa in the timeframe? 
 
7.1 Forged and Shaped in the international realm 
I would like to begin this discussion by returning to the events which led to the creation of 
the modern state of Israel. The idea of Zionism, the Jewish quest for a state, came in part as a 
result of the nationalistic impulses of the nineteenth century. It also came as a solution for 
the Jewish people whom had existed scattered throughout Europe like a stateless pariah-
people. If Events called for it the Jews represented a convenient scapegoat.307 When facing 
persecution the Jews received no protection from any great powers, states or organizations. 
The goal of finding a Jewish state was set by the Zionist organization in 1897 as the Ottoman 
Empire was crumbling. By convincing the British Foreign minister Arthur Balfour, that the 
establishment of Jewish national home in the Middle East region was beneficiary to the 
interest of the British Empire, the organization received a written document promising 
Britain’s  support in that endeavor. This was not easily combined with the British mandate 
of Palestine, and thus began a long political battle between Israel, the Arab population 
within the mandate, and the great power Britain. In my opinion, the Balfour deceleration or 
its interpretation towards implementation represents a failure by the responsibility of 
Britain as a great power. A “national home” does not automatically imply as sovereign state 
as Hannah Arendt also pointed out. She blamed the British Mandate for reinforcing the 
nationalistic identities of both Arabs and Israeli’s by mediating between and separating 
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them. As both sides focused on getting rid of the British Mandate, they neglected the 
permanent reality of each other’s presence.308 Nevertheless, Britain failed their local 
preponderance when proving unable at obtaining lasting peaceful solutions and regional 
stability in the mandate. Britain had painted itself into a corner in the Middle East, while its 
colonial empire deteriorated on a global scale. When Britain withdrew from its mandate and 
left the responsibility to the UN, UN was also unable to achieve a peaceful solution, and its 
division plans was declined by both sides. After WWII, the Holocaust and the international 
attention to the Jewish suffering also the new emerging great powers was influenced. The 
USA and the Soviet Union, both immediately recognized Israel as a sovereign state upon 
Israel’s declaration of independence.309 The incidents of WWII became forever intangible 
from the Jewish consciousness and proved to them the strong necessity of achieving a 
sovereign state that could enable their security. This sovereign state, Israel, was a product of 
international society.  
 
7.2 From Israel’s perception 
“Small nations do not have a foreign policy. They have a defense policy.” – Moshe Dayan310 
 
The conditions under which the Israeli state was created; the special history and 
psychology of the Jewish people, along with the security threats posed by its neighbors 
to the ancient dream that the state of Israel materialized; all shaped Israel’s application, 
perception and interpretation of the established rules, norms and practices of 
international society. In most cases, and most of the time Israel was acting abiding to 
these principles that according to Bull was provided by the institutions of international 
society.311 In many cases however, the opposite was also true. Israel was efficient, 
pragmatic and creative in maintaining its security and balance of power locally. This 
success often came at the cost of breaking with the rules, practices and norms of 
international law, war, and diplomacy, which were secondary concerns to the 
maintenance of state sovereignty and the local balance of power. What good would the 
maintenance of these rules be to Israel if there was no state? When bending or breaking 
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these rules Israel was very concerned with still being perceived as obedient. The 
document analysis reveals that Israel would cover up and also resort to untruthfulness 
to deny any such action. In the Eichmann case of 1960, Israel first claimed the operation 
was a private initiative.312 When or if, the situation was no longer possible to deny, 
Israel might, as in the Eichmann incident, apologize the incident and explain the event as 
a special exception from the normal law-abiding behavior. After the attack on the Israeli 
athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, Mossad began a global hunt for the men 
responsible. At that time Israel saw revenge and the deterrence of similar operations, as 
having a higher priority than the fundamental principle of sovereignty. Israel was 
willing to break international law and risk the potential humiliation of being caught 
while violating sovereignty.313 Yet by denying the facts even when caught red handed, 
Israel demonstrated the central importance of rule abiding behavior. For instance; 
Mossad denied the responsibility for the assassination of an innocent man in 
Lillehammer 1973, until April 2014.314 
 
Between 1970 and 1973 Israel violated the territorial sovereignty of several European 
and Arab states by assassinating terrorist and conducting operations on foreign 
territory. Israel also forced a civil Lebanese airliner to land on an Israeli military airport 
on the suspicion of carrying a high ranking Palestinian terrorist leader, in August 1973. 
Such a violation of aerial freedom damaged Israel`s effort to build the immunity of civil 
aviation, particularly in regards to hijackings. It made Abba Eban, The Israeli Minister of 
Foreign Affairs; “(…) wonder if our government was still in full contact with international 
reality.”315 Eban was also concerned with the Israeli refusal to negotiate with Sadat in 
the same period. Israel’s tactic was to wait until Egypt and Syria agreed to the Israeli 
solutions for permanent peace, as they had no real option but a continuation of the 
occupation. This “diplomacy” towards the Arabs built on the successful recipe of 1948 
when Israel only agreed to cease-fires and armistice lines, thus avoided direct peace 
negotiations in which they were forced to permanent solution that was non beneficial to 
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Israel. This in turn led to confrontations that Israel again used to better their position 
seizing control of demilitarized zones or destroying its enemy’s military capabilities.  
 
In the early 1970’s, Eban was according to himself of the impression that the Israeli 
leadership behaved overly confident in its military capabilities and arrogant towards 
Egypt and the willingness of Sadat to negotiate peace after he became President. Defense 
Minister Dayan’s suggested in 1971 to withdraw from the canal for strategic and 
diplomatic concerns. His suggestion was to retreat 30 km from the canal and by such 
removing the tension with the Soviet Union, and Arab and African states which were 
depending on an open canal for trade. Eban thinks this could have avoided the Yom 
Kippur War. Dayan’s suggestion did however not receive consensus, and the matter was 
dropped. In retrospect, Eban saw the Yom Kippur as resulting from the overall failed 
diplomacy with Sadat from1971 to 1973.316  
 
As Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, East Jerusalem and the Golan heights in 1967, a 
return to the UN division plan seemed long forgotten. Israel had been forced to retreat in 
1956 during the Suez War due to American political pressure and Soviet Union threats. 
In 1956 as in 1967 Israel lacked a Security Council approval of its war. On both 
occasions Israel claimed preemptive war for self-help, which in itself is no legitimate 
cause according to the UN charter.317 If we remember Michael Waltzer’s war concept 
from the theory chapter however, just war may be fought also if threatened with an 
attack.318 We are then left to the world of discourse where the hostile statements of Arab 
decision-makers promising Israel’s destruction, Arab military mobilizations and the 
blockades of Tiran must be interpreted as warnings, threats, or actual intent to attack. 
The legitimacy of war in international society, under the preconditions of a functioning 
balance of power and great power management, is ultimately decided by the great 
powers and other state members of international society’s willingness to stop or 
support the war. Israel had made it perfectly clear after the Suez war that a renewed 
closure of the Suez would be interpreted as a declaration of war.  
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To some Israeli decision makers the American reluctance to resupply Israel during the 
Yom Kippur War may have been more proof of a Realist reality of international 
cooperation. After the Yom Kippur War, Israel developed its arms industry into 
becoming one of its major export industries. This certainly indicates a higher priority of 
obtaining self-reliance of arms. If we assume that Polakow-Suransky319 was right when 
he argued that Israel used the nuclear weapons as leverage to acquire more arms and 
support from USA during the Yom Kippur, it must have confirmed to Israeli decision-
makers the value of bending or breaking the rules. Realism oriented acts such as the 
secret nuclear weapons program had contributed to secure Israel’s sovereignty in time 
of crisis. It is however not impossible that Israel always observed and abided the rules, 
norms and practices of international society from a Realist understanding, where being 
perceived rule-obedient was the best option, as it was most likely to provide maximum 
payoff.  
 
I argue that, regardless of periods dominated by a Realist world perception among key 
decision makers, Israel as a state-actor in the timeframe 1955 to 1974, acted as if the 
framework of norms, rules and practices were desirable goals in themselves, secondary 
only to the principles of sovereignty and security. The goals were desirable for the sake 
of the society of states, but also as means to maintain Israel’s sovereignty and achieve 
just change from an Israeli point of view. At the same time the common norms and rules 
put limitations on Israel’s behavior, while Israel did its best to resist these limitations 
and influence matters to its advantage. The rules norms and practices of international 
society both restrained and enabled Israel’s goals through balance of power, 
international law, diplomacy, war and the great power management. Israel saw it as its 
task to power maximize its utility of those institutions bending and breaking the rules 
norms and practices, for securing the state. I argue on basis of the document material, 
that Israel’s power maximizing, its bending and breaking of international rules, norms 
and practices went further than what was rational in the long term. Israel’s international 
reputation was damaged; it had lost its favor even in much of the Western “audience”. 
While enjoying much sympathy after WWII, Israel by 1974 was no longer seen as a 
victim. To many, Israel had become an oppressor, an international bully which did as it 
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pleased. It had by many been branded a hypocrite, which Waltzer320 warns against. Its 
short term security focus had come at a great cost. While seeking to save the Jewish 
people from its status as a pariah people, the Israel state had arguably become a pariah 
state, an outcast of international society. Israel seemed to be unable to act sufficiently 
rule and norm abiding to avoid damaging its reputation. Limiting Israel’s norm breaking 
behavior and holding it accountable was however also the task of the great power 
management. 
 
7.3 The Great Power Management 
What then, of the great power management of the region and its task of maintaining 
order and local preponderance? To what degree was Israel controlled and held 
accountable? Israel broke with the framework of norms and rules and practices when it 
perceived it necessary, and whenever the gains outweighed the disadvantages. From the 
documentation, I get the impression that Israel’s willingness to do so did not only stem 
from the amount of perceived danger or security concerns. Violations seem to increase 
with the amount of great power support and the level of confidence in Israel’s defense 
establishment.  
 
The Soviet Union and the USA managed to stop Israel in the 1956 Suez War by using 
threats and political pressure. Before the Six Day War USA had warned Israel from 
attacking first, warning that Israel could not rely on American support if they did. When 
the Soviet Union pressured USA to obtain a truce during the Six Day War, the Americans 
hesitated before eventually pressuring Israel. Only after Israel had obtained its most 
important goals of the war did USA begin to cooperate with the Soviet Union for an 
immediate UN truce resolution. The War was over 10th of June, but the Security Council 
was unable to agree on the peace terms. USA would only support a full Israeli retreat if 
the Arab countries recognized Israel as a sovereign state. US President Johnson 
promised Israel that USA would not back any resolution that Israel resisted. According 
to Waage, Johnson demanded in return a mobilization of the Israel supports to secure 
his candidateship in the upcoming US election.  
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Israel announced that it annexed East Jerusalem regardless of any Arab recognition. The 
result was Resolution 242 which was so vaguely formulated that it led to no solution. 
Israel would not retreat until receiving formal recognition, and the Arabs would not 
negotiate until Israel withdrew. With this US “carte blanche” given to Israel, it is possible 
that Israel after the Six Day War, perceived their balancing efforts to align with the 
American general balance concerns, at least to a large extent. All negotiation in the UN 
eventually failed and the war of Attrition slowly escalated. It ended after an American 
initiative in June 1970 managed to bring both sides to the negotiating table, but once 
again with American guarantees that Israel would not have to retreat from the occupied 
areas until a peace agreement was found that Israel could accept.321 The same year, USA 
asked Israel for assistance in the Jordanian civil war, even at the potential cost of the 
newly regained peace with Egypt and Syria. By now it would not be unreasonable for 
Israel to consider itself as acting as something of an extension of the US balancing 
power, battling Egypt and the Soviet Union interests, by proxy for the USA. Was it no 
longer bound by the same rules as other states, enjoying all the rights of a great power, 
while less of the responsibility? 
 
It is my opinion that USA seized the opportunity which the occupation of the Six Day 
War represented, to force the Arabs towards recognition of Israel. I argue that this was 
seen by the Americans as the path of least resistance towards some sort of stability in 
the Middle East which also maintained the interest of its regional partner. When 
providing Israel with unconditional support in the peace negotiations, the continued 
armament of Israel through the War of Attrition was both a way to battle the Soviet 
Union by proxy, and a continued investment in the American path or policy towards 
regional order. Demanding an Israeli retreat without any Arab recognition of Israel 
would have hurt both Israeli and American prestige and invited a continuation of the 
conflict on the Arab claims of Israel’s illegitimacy. By giving a guarantee to Israel that it 
did not have to retreat until it had obtained peace the way it wanted, Israel had no need 
to negotiate with Egypt and could enjoy the territorial buffer that the occupation of Sinai 
and Golan offered. USA had achieved temporary peace by this agreement and avoided a 
confrontation with the Soviet Union.  
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Some responsibility can be placed with the Soviet Union who was unable to end the 
occupation by exerting sufficient pressure on USA and Israel. The Soviet Union supplied 
Egypt with arms and experts, and was also fighting Israeli forces in air-battles on behalf 
of the Egyptian army. I argue that the Soviet Union contributed as much as possible 
while avoiding direct confrontation between the great powers. Mutual nuclear 
deterrence has raised the bar for direct confrontation among great powers, and created 
the conditions where battle was waged by proxy states. The American proxy (Israel) 
was simply more efficient than the proxy’s fighting for the Soviet Union. Eventually, in 
spite of Egyptian forces being more successful than what was expected during the Yom 
Kippur War, the Soviet Union lost its influence in Egypt after the war. 
 
The Yom Kippur War created a great power crisis. The Soviet Union was aware about 
the Arab war plans two days ahead of the attack, but failed their great power 
management responsibilities when not alerting the USA. When the war was initiated, 
both the Soviet Union and the USA, falsely assumed Israel would obtain a new swift 
victory. Initially USA also failed to understand the urgency of Israel’s situation. By 
putting Israel in jeopardy, the Soviet Union threatened Americas material and 
psychological investment in Israel and the American regional influence. This created a 
strong incentive for American intervention. The massive American arms supply that 
followed likely put Soviet Union decision makers on high alert.322 By the 10th of October 
Israel had the gained the advantage in the war and while both the Soviet Union and the 
USA shuttled arms to their partners, Sadat had to admit defeat only nine days later. 
Nixon was preoccupied with the Watergate scandal and Henry Kissinger the Jewish 
American foreign Minister had supplied everything Israel needed to battle Communism. 
Israel continued its advance. Soviet Union threats to mobilize were ignored by the USA, 
and the Soviet Union began mobilizing. The USA had to force Israel, whose forces were 
deep into Syrian and Egyptian territory to retreat. Both the USA and the Soviet Union 
went into heightened nuclear readiness the 24th to 25th of October before Israel accepted 
a truce and pulled back its troops.323 
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Michael Brecher argued, with the advantage of historical hindsight, that a policy of non-
alignment might have been the most rational choice in order to obtain the maximum 
amount of great power support for Israel. Israel’s security focus or eager to obtain 
American support, led to this missed opportunity. Brecher points to how non-alignment 
would have avoided Israel the brand as a Western patron, a brand that according to 
Brecher led to Israel’s failure in obtaining a lasting and natural link with the Third World 
states. It was to Brecher, natural in the sense of the Jewish people and the former 
colonies were both unfairly and cruelly treated. He argues it would not have come at the 
cost of military and economic aid. “(…) Non-Alignment is not an obstacle to assistance 
from the super-powers; if anything, it leads to more aid! Once more a power asset was 
wasted, for Israel possessed the conditions of Non-Alignment par excellence.”324 If Brecher 
is right, then Israel’s strong efforts to achieve US or Western security guarantees was 
certainly not the result of a Realist rational actor, utility maximizing among several 
options. 
 
7.4 Israel relationship towards Africa  
How can Israel’s relationship towards the international rules, norms and practiced be said 
to have influenced its relationship towards Africa? Israel’s massive push to obtain new 
friends and allies in post-colonial Africa was the result of several factors. In relation to 
local balance of power it was of strategic importance to befriend the states surrounding 
Israel’s Arab enemies, particularly after the Suez Campaign in which Israel was seen as 
the henchman of the former colonial powers Britain and France. All votes in the UN 
General Assembly are counted equally, and by investing in African nations before their 
gained their independence Israel secured a lot of votes in the years to come. Israel also 
established military presence in African states to obtain access to strategically 
important areas and drain Egyptian resources in regional conflicts. Israel-African 
friendships also provided new markets and access to natural resources. From a 
diplomatic perspective the initiative was clearly image building. The Israeli Kibbutzim 
style of the cooperation, focused on training and making the Africans self-sufficient 
which proved to have lasting positive effects. Israel also displayed itself as being one of 
the South African Apartheids regime biggest critics, but always maintained some level of 
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relations and trade with the regime. There was a large Jewish population in South Africa, 
and South Africa supplied much of Israel’s diamond industry and later also Israel’s 
uranium deposits.  
The Arabs worked hard to destroy Israel’s influence in post-colonial Africa. The first 
Arab efforts to brand Israel as a Western imperialist following the Suez War was 
unsuccessful. Nevertheless the Africans observed Israel’s assistance as non-exploitative 
and it even came without ideological strings. With the occupation of Jordanian, Egyptian, 
and Syrian territory following the Six day War Israel was once again labeled as a colonial 
imperialist. With the closure of the Suez Canal most of the African states suffered 
economically, except South Africa which was thriving under the renewed shipping traffic 
around the southern Cape of Africa. By 1972 the post-colonial African states began 
turning away from Israel one by one, and most of them severed diplomatic ties with 
Israel before the Yom Kippur Was over. Israel lost much of its incentive to avoid further 
collaboration with the South African apartheid regime. By 1974 a defense agreement 
was established between the two states. Document gathered by Sasha Polakow-
Suransky indicate that Israel was willing to sell the Apartheid regime nuclear warheads 
already by 1975. This certainly represents a sharp shift in relation from the volunteer 
arms embargo against South Africa which Israel committed too in 1963. 
 
Israel’s cooperation with the post-colonial states had been the pride of Israeli foreign 
relations since 1958. Golda Meir could not hide her disappointment in her memoirs with 
the African’s decision to sever ties in 1973. Other than by Arab pressure and financial 
aid, this severance of ties came as a consequence of Israel’s continued occupation, its 
rigid stance in its negotiation towards Egypt, and its military success in the Yom Kippur 
War in which it advanced far into Syria and Egypt. Israel now had little to lose by 
enforcing ties to South Africa who was also considered an international pariah state. In 
addition its natural resources, South Africa were also a good market for Israel’s booming 
weapons industry. What may seem an unlikely alliance of the Jewish state and the once 
Nazi-sympathetic South African leadership developed into a mutually beneficial 




7.5 A brief look at tendencies in the current international realm 
Can Israel’s actions relation to the rules, norms and practices at the time explain current 
state interaction under the present framework of rules, norms and practices? Material 
war is still, at times, waged without the proper Security Council approvals. Following the 
September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA, the Security Council authorized USA 
to overthrow the Taliban regime.325 But the American and British invasion of Iraq in 
2003 which was attempted legitimized by the search for weapons of mass destruction, 
received no Security Council approval, and was eventually explained as a massive 
American intelligence error.326 The American’s war on terrorism is continued on a 
global scale today, and USA is receiving increasing criticism of its use of armed drones. 
However, as these drone attacks are conducted in Arab, African and Asian states they do 
not seem to evoke the same reactions in the West as the Israeli assassinations on 
European streets in the early 70’s.327  
 
The last two months we have seen a Ukrainian crisis unfold. Russia’s President Putin 
denied in March that there were Russian troops on Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula. Later 
in April he admitted that there in fact were Russian troops present, before and during 
the Crimean referendum for the Russian annexation.328 Ukraine had a right to defend its 
sovereignty through self-help, but seemed reluctant to mobilize, as to create the pretext 
of an escalation. No other state came to Ukraine’s assistance, most likely based on a 
perception of Ukraine as a part of the Russian sphere of influence. An intervention by 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would mean a large possibility for 
confrontations between NATO and Russia. Professor Paul W. Khan of Yale Law School 
argues that we are back to a Cold War situation in which states are controlled by one 
great power or the other. “These four principles — the prohibition of the use of force, the 
respect for borders, the Security Council responsibility for maintenance of peace and the 
requirement of public transparency — were the basis for international law among 
independent states. Those principles have all been cast aside, with little effort even to offer 
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a legal justification. Russian action in Ukraine tells us clearly that international relations 
based on law instead of violence remain fragile and under threat.” 329 Putin has several 
times pointed to the Western hypocrisy, which he now seems to be participating in.330 It 
is difficult to predict the future of international law or the way states and great powers 
relate to the established framework of rules, norms and practices. In my opinion there 
has been an increased awareness and communication around the subject of 
international law and state-hypocrisy since the Iraq invasion. This is however not the 
same as an increase of states acting law-disrupting as a matter of fact. Revolutions in 
Arab states have kept the debate most relevant as there has been much frustration with 
the subject of intervention. There is still however a strong respect of spheres of 
influence. NATO is at the time of writing demonstrating its commitment to its Baltic and 
East-European members through the ongoing “Steadfast Javelin 1” military exercise in 
Estonia.331 According to US President Obama, USA only perceives Russia to be a regional 
power, who would struggle to compete with USA’s global influence. I would however, 
argue that the mutual nuclear deterrence between Russia and USA is sufficient to 
maintain a general balance that facilitates the preconditions of a society of states, 
avoiding a situation where USA is allowed to acts as an unchallenged predominant 
power.332 I also argue that in addition to a general balance there is a great power 
management in place facilitating what Bull calls the institutions of international society. 
Diplomacy also has the conditions it requires, and war is in my opinion both limited and 
controlled. Some material war may be unable to meet the requirements the 
international society has set in order to be perceived “just”, but what is “just” is also 
essentially, decided by the willingness to mobilize.  
It is my opinion the four principles of international law presented by Khan has not been 
cast aside any more today than it was for instance from 1955 to 1974. This thesis reveal, 
in my opinion, that the bending and breaking of international law, and other norms rules 
and practices in the society of states has been a constant condition occurring with 
shifting intensity throughout modern state history since WWII. As Bull points out law 
breaking is not as bad as a rejection of the society itself, the latter of which is only the 
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practice North Korea to my knowledge. Also,crisis or the threat of war is not just a threat 
to international society; it can also be used for its maintenance. Even the threat of crisis 
or collapse may serve a purpose as it may remind actors that it is contrary to the 
common interest.333 I do not believe that the Ukrainian crisis will lead to a collapse of 
international law or the norms rules and practices of the modern society of states. In my 
view this is an adjustment of the general balance and the great power management, 
where Russia is displaying strength. The open discourse of hypocrisy may very well lead 
to a reaffirming or strengthening of commitment to international law in regards to 
legitimate war, interventions and annexations. Such an adjustment may come in the 
aftermath of material war or as an alternative to it. I do nevertheless agree with 
Professor Khans assessment of future challenges of blurred lines in regards to war and 
international law; “This is what future wars will look like: not the massed armor of 
battalions on the move, but a close intermeshing of targeted violence and information 
control in pursuit of political ends. International law is not at all prepared for this future. It 
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This chapter concludes upon the research objectives and the results. It also contains a 
brief evaluation of the research project, and suggestions for further research. 
 
8.1 Review of the Research Objectives 
 
The first research question was aimed at investigating the actions of Israel in the 
international society of states from 1955 to 1974, in order to unveil Israel’s relation to the 
framework of norms, rules and practices of the international society of states. I would not 
have been able to obtain such data using Neorealist theory, focusing solely on the structural 
restraints of the system of the states as the output of the behavior of the parts, as it cannot 
account for the mutual beneficial collaboration of states in maintaining common rules, 
values norms, and practices. Allison’s three models would have been unable to look at 
foreign policy development as something beyond the result of internal processes, and hence 
also not suitable for our purposes.To uncover the relationship I used Hedley Bull’s 
institutional framework as indicators upon the document material. By analyzing Israel’s 
actions in relation to balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and the great 
powers, I obtained a good understanding of how Israel related to this framework.  
 
My analysis reveals that Israel, most likely due to its special history and psychology, was 
too absorbed with power maximizing in its goal achievements. In most of the timeframe 
this priority was first and foremost based upon the goal of obtaining and maintaining, 
security and sovereignty. Upon reaching a relatively secure situation after 1970, Israel 
continued to power-maximize, partly by habit, partly because Israel felt it was in control 
and partly as it was perceived to be the best investment for Israel’s future security.  
Israel perceived that its best option to secure sovereignty and security was to achieve 
great power support from the USA. This policy led to several missed opportunities for 
Israel. Michael Brecher argued that Israel would have profited the most by practicing 
non-alignment. This would have created great power competition for Israel’s friendship 
and a better relationship between Israel and the Third World states.  
The power maximizing approach led Israel to bend and break the framework of rules, 
norms and practices of international society when it perceived it necessary or 
sufficiently profitable. Nevertheless, the central value of the framework for Israel is 
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evident in the evidence that reveals how far Israel went to be perceived as abiding or 
conforming, by sometimes denying the violation, or rationalizing it. Israel was also 
mostly acting in accordance to the framework and contributed to the maintenance of the 
norms, rules and practices by demanding its surroundings do the same. Hence while the 
rules, norms and practices acted restricting upon Israel, Israel worked to use the 
framework to its perceived advantage. I use the term “perceived advantage” as the 
document material reveal several decisions that did not work solely for Israel’s 
advantage. For instance, the unwillingness to negotiate with Sadat became a major cause 
for the Yom Kippur War. Also, Israel’s short term security thinking involved violations of 
sovereignty and came at the cost of Israel’s image in the general Western public. Israel 
lost support in many states including its friendships in post-colonial Africa.  
 
The relationship between Israel and the international society developed as Israel was 
both restrained and enabled by the framework of norms, rules and practices. I argue 
that Israel proved very skilled at applying this framework for its goal achievements, and 
was not sufficiently restrained. Some responsibility must therefore be placed with USA, 
which I argue; failed to act rationally in accordance to its responsibility to maintain the 
general balance and the great power management. Though the peace negotiations 
following the Yom Kippur war eventually led to an Egyptian recognition of Israel and 
permanent borders, it is my opinion that USA failed at creating the regional stability in a 
violence restricting and efficient manner. 
 
The USA failed at demanding an Israeli withdrawal after the Six Day War. It also failed 
by providing Israel with little incentive to negotiate, while continuing to arm and 
support Israel in the War of Attrition. If failed its responsibilities further, when asking 
for Israel’s assistance in the Jordanian Civil war and by its action during the Yom Kippur 
War. In the Yom Kippur War context it must be mentioned that USA might have 
perceived itself as preventing a nuclear escalation by arming Israel with conventional 
arms. This overall American great power failure was not of such nature that the general 
balance or the great power management collapsed, but it created unnecessary crisis 
between the great powers as well as regionally in the Middle East. As a consequence of 
its supportive Israel politics, USA alienated many Arab states which contributed to the 
OPEC boycott which created crisis also internally in the US. It is my opinion, based on 
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the document analysis that USA was too concerned with Israeli needs compared to that 
which would have been reasonable in accordance with a great powers rights and duties. 
Bull’s theory states that part of the great power management is to avoid being seen as 
contributing to disorder, in order to have legitimacy for its special rights and duties.335  
 
The second research problem was aimed at analyzing how Israel’s relationship to the 
framework of norm, rules and practices, influenced Israel’ relationship towards Africa. 
From the document analysis I learned how the periphery strategy of befriending post-
colonial Africa came in part as a reply to the unpopular Suez War, and partly as a 
necessity of limiting the Arab influence in the African region. Hence the policy was to 
some the degree the result of the restriction or necessity of having international 
support. At the same time this policy was enabled, by of the possibility of states 
emerging in the international society from the former colonial rule. Though the Arab 
nations applied heavy pressure to destroy this relationship, Israel was in the end 
responsible for the collapse. Though the Suez War and the Six day war were unpopular 
in Africa, the occupation of Sinai, the closure of Suez and The Yom Kippur War which in 
the end tipped the scale, could have been avoided. With the breakdown of all prospects 
in the former colonies, Israel lost its biggest rationale for developing further ties with 
South Africa. The collaboration with the apartheid regime was enabled as part of the 
restriction that Israel’s new unpopularity represented. 
 
8.2 Evaluation of the Research Project and suggestions for Future 
Research 
In this thesis I have analyzed Israel’s interaction with the rules, norms and practices of 
the international society from 1955 to 1974. The document analysis was conducted on a 
extensive document material, which was necessary to obtain a nuanced analysis with a 
balanced triangulation of sources. I was careful in the beginning with my potential bias 
for the Arab cause, but after reading many biographies of key Israeli decision-makers, I 
had to reflect upon to what degree I was influenced with the very personal portrayal of 
events by these individuals. I believe that I have managed to conduct a neutral analysis 
that can provide insight on Israel as a special case in regards to state interaction with 
the framework of norms, rules and practices, but also as a case that can provide 
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understanding on the subject in general. Not just on other historical cases, but perhaps 
even more relevant as a measurement on current affairs. Particularly, when there is an 
increased concern with the sustainability and future of international law and other 
rules, norms and practices of international society.  
 
My suggestion for further research within the field would be to first look at other 
important historical cases to broaden the basis for understanding current events. It is off 
course both tempting and perhaps possible to jump directly ahead to conduct an 
analysis of state interaction with the framework, using events from for instance year 
2000 and towards today. Such a case on relatively recent events will not have the same 
in depth documents available such as memoirs, thorough analysis such as that of 
Michael Brecher336, or primary-type publicized government documents. The news 
coverage has however improved since the 1950’s and there is a lot of material available 
through thorough journalism, and also academic papers and books, quickly available in 
digital form. There might also be a great potential of resources by leaked government 
documents, such as made available through Wikileaks, a recognized internet drop box 
for, for instance government officials that want to share secret information.337 Edward 
Snowden, a former CIA contractor also published documents revealing the extent of 
American surveillance, and has promised to publish more material.338 These sources in 
themselves pose a new problem for the great powers and all other states acting in 
breach with the framework of norms, rules and practices of international society. 
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